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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Besides those parties listed in the caption, petitioner Frank Osborne 
("Osborne") purported to direct his petition for writ of mandamus to all district courts in 
the state of Utah, even though no district court had taken or refused to take any action he 
sought to compel or correct. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3). Respondent Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. 
("Adoption Center"), however, questions whether the Court of Appeals properly had 
before it any issue that could have been remedied by issuance of a writ of mandamus. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[o]nly the 
questions set forth in the petition [for writ of certiorari] or fairly included therein will be 
considered by the Supreme Court." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). It is not at all clear that 
the questions set forth in Osborne's brief are the same questions in his petition for writ of 
certiorari. The questions he listed in his petition for writ of certiorari are: 
1. Does Utah have the power, under its Adoption 
Code (U.C.A. Title 78, Chapter 30), and notwithstanding 
requirements of Amendment XIV of the United States 
Constitution, to exercise in personam jurisdiction over and 
apply its law to a nonresident natural father whose child is 
placed for adoption in Utah, when there is no independent 
basis for exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the father? 
2. May a nonresident natural father whose child is 
placed for adoption in Utah be forced to waive a defense 
based upon lack of in personam jurisdiction if he brings a 
challenge to in personam jurisdiction in a Utah court, and 
would such a waiver constitute a violation of Article I, 
Section 7 and Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, 
or Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution? 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3. Pursuant to Rule 49(a)(4), these questions should 
prevail over any inconsistent issues stated in Osborne's brief. 
1 
Yet, these questions are also a spin removed from the relief he sought in the 
Court of Appeals. He sought a writ of mandamus, purportedly directed to every district 
court in Utah, ordering that he be allowed to appear in a Utah court to challenge the 
adoption without waiving his defense that Utah has no personal jurisdiction over him. 
Original Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Temporary Restraining Order ("Mand. 
Pet.") at 1. How this Court views the issues Osborne presents is limited by the type of 
relief he sought in the Court of Appeals. 
Osborne also does not fully state the standard of review, claiming that the 
standard is simply "correction of error." Pet. Br. at 1, 2. He cites no authority. On 
certiorari, this Court does review the decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness, 
but the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision turns on whether that court 
accurately performed its functions. State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, \ 6, 46 P.3d 230, 232 
("correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately 
reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review"). Thus, this 
Court also must determine whether mandamus relief was appropriate. The Court of 
Appeals had to "look at the nature of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged in the 
petition, and the purpose of the type of writ sought in deciding whether to grant 
extraordinary relief." Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995) 
(emphasis added). 
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Controlling statutory provisions, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.12, 
78-30-4.13, 78-30-4.14(2)(b), (4), and (5), and 78-30-4.15(4), are reproduced in 
Addendum 1, along with selected provisions of North Carolina law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in 
Lower Courts. 
Contrary to an assumption this Court appears to have made since Osborne 
first sought relief in this Court, this began as an original proceeding in the Court of 
Appeals because Osborne did not appeal rulings of the district court concerning his rights 
to the child at issue. He commenced a proceeding in Fourth District Court in Utah 
County on February 14, 2002, to challenge the district court's subject matter jurisdiction 
over any adoption proceedings, but when that court ruled on March 18, 2002, that he had 
waived any notice and consent rights he may have in any adoption proceedings 
concerning the child, Osborne voluntarily dismissed that action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 12-39, 141-46, 147-48.1 
Osborne then filed an action in federal court on or about April 5, 2002, 
arguing that he has a constitutional right to challenge the adoption without a Utah court 
exercising personal jurisdiction over him. That was the first time Osborne raised his 
1UR." refers to pages from the district court record. Many pages of the district 
court record are attached as Addendum 2 to this brief. The confusion engendered by the 
procedures Osborne has followed is evident from the fact this Court requested a record 
from the district court, even though this began as an original proceeding in the Court of 
Appeals. 
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personal jurisdiction argument directly in any court, and it was in federal district court 
On June 21,2002, the federal court refused to grant temporary injunctive relief, and 
within hours Osborne filed an original proceeding in the Utah Court of Appeals—not a 
federal court of appeals—seeking a writ of mandamus and temporary restraining order.2 
Osborne argued in the Court of Appeals that he has a constitutional right to 
challenge the adoption without the Utah court exercising personal jurisdiction over him. 
On July 2, 2002, the Court of Appeals looked past the question of whether mandamus 
relief would even be appropriate under the circumstances and went directly to the merits, 
flatly rejecting Osborne's request and ruling that Osborne had waived his rights to the 
child at issue and that his personal jurisdiction argument is meritless. Add. 3. Osborne 
filed his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court on August 1, 2002, and this Court 
granted his petition on September 11, 2002. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Adoption Center is a licensed child placing agency with its principal 
offices in Orem, Utah. R. 77. The child that is the subject of this case was born in Utah 
on August 6, 2001. R. 37, Tf 11. The mother, who was from North Carolina, had 
contacted an adoption agency in Utah previous to the birth of the child, and came to Utah 
to give birth and place the child for adoption. R. 37-38, \ \ 9-11. The mother was 
Apparently, Osborne's lawyers were also confused as the Court of Appeals' file 
shows that the check for the filing fee was made out to the US Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
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married to someone other than Osborne at the time of conception and birth, and the child 
was given the surname of the birth mother's husband. R. 70, 72. 
Osborne knew that the mother had made contact with a Utah adoption 
agency and that she had come to Utah with the intent to give birth and place the child for 
adoption. Mand. Pet. at 4; R. 37-38, ffij 9, 10. After the child's birth, however, the 
mother initially decided not to place the child for adoption and returned to North 
Carolina. Mand. Pet. at 4; R. 37, ^ 11-12. She lived with her mother for a week, then 
apparently lived with Osborne until no later than December 10, 2001—for a little more 
than three months—when she moved out.3 Mand. Pet. at 4-5; R. 36, ^ j 20. 
Significantly, while Osbome claims the child developed a bonding 
relationship with the mother's other son D J., nowhere in the district court or the Court of 
Appeals did he claim that the child developed a bonding relationship with him. See 
Mand. Pet. at 5; R. 37, fflf 15-16. Also, during the three months the mother lived with 
Osborne, he claims he tried on two different occasions to get her to execute a voluntary 
declaration of paternity with him, but she would not do so. R. 36, ^ j 18. Even with her 
refusals to execute a voluntary declaration of paternity, Osbome did not file paternity or 
legitimation proceedings in North Carolina.4 
3The mother did not live with Osbome for five months as he claims. The child 
was not even five months old when he was placed for adoption by his mother. 
4Under North Carolina law, a person, other than the woman's husband, claiming 
to be the father of a child born to a married woman must file legitimation proceedings 
and prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence to be legally recognized as the 
child's father. N.C. Code Ann. § 49-12.1. In this case, we have nothing but Osborne's 
word that he is the father. 
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In early January, 2002, the mother again informed Osborne that she was 
going to Utah to place the child for adoption.5 Mand. Pet. at 6; R. 36, Tf 23. The mother 
returned to Utah and on January 4,2002—at least 25 days after the mother had ceased 
living with Osborne—relinquished her parental rights to the child to Adoption Center so 
that he could be placed for adoption. R. 74-75, ^  24. At that time, the child was just 
under five months old. R. 37, <|j 11; R. 35 % 25. The mother's husband also signed a 
relinquishment and consent to adoption on January 15, 2002. R. 69-70. Adoption 
Center placed the minor child for adoption with Mr. and Mrs. S. R. 35, ^  27. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.22, however, Adoption Center has legal custody of and is 
responsible for the minor child until his adoption is finalized. 
Not until February 11, 2002—more than one month after he was informed 
that the mother and her husband had placed the child for adoption in Utah—did Osborne 
commence a paternity and custody action in North Carolina.6 R. 35, ^ f 30. Osborne also 
5Osborne filed a motion in the Court of Appeals to supplement the record with 
information purporting to show he did not know the mother had returned to Utah until 
after she had relinquished the child. Petitioner's Appendix ("Pet. App.") 36. While 
these facts do not change the outcome, Adoption Center opposed the motion and the 
Court of Appeals never ruled on it before that court rejected Osborne's petition. There 
have been no findings by a district court on this issue. 
6This proceeding, however, is not a proper legitimation proceeding under North 
Carolina law because he only named the natural mother as a party and did not name the 
mother's spouse or the child as required by N.C. Code Ann. §§ 49-12.1 and 49-10. He 
also has not sought the appointment of a guardian ad litem as required by § 49-12.1. 
Thus, the outcome of this action cannot be a finding that he is the legal father of the 
child. 
6 
has never filed a paternity action in Utah or a notice of any paternity action with the Utah 
State Registrar of Vital Statistics. R. 67. 
On February 14, 2002, Osborne filed a Verified Petition Challenging 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction ("Verified Petition") in Fourth District Court challenging the 
district court's subject matter jurisdiction over any proceeding regarding the adoption or 
custody of the child. R. 12-39. In the Verified Petition, Osborne did not raise the 
personal jurisdiction issues he now raises in this Court. 
On February 20, 2002, Osborne issued a subpoena to Adoption Center 
commanding Adoption Center to reveal: (1) the name and address of the adoptive 
parents, (2) the attorneys involved in the adoption proceeding, and (3) the county in 
which the adoption proceeding was filed and the names of all judges who have issued 
any rulings or orders in the adoption case. R. 57-58. On February 26, 2002, Adoption 
Center filed a motion to quash the subpoena, R. 65-66, arguing that Osborne had waived 
his notice and consent rights under Utah law regarding any adoption. R. 81-85. 
On March 1, 2002, at Osborne's request, the district court heard Adoption 
Center's motion to quash. Osborne's lawyer appeared and presented argument, and 
thereafter filed two supplemental memoranda, arguing that the district court had no in 
personam jurisdiction to rule on his rights. R. 102-05, 136-40. In the second 
memorandum, Osborne stated that "[i]f this Court rejects Mr. Osborne's subject matter 
jurisdiction argument, he fully intends to challenge this Court's exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over him." R. 137. 
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On March 18,2002, the Fourth District Court granted Adoption Center's 
motion to quash. R. 141-46. That court held that "Frank Osborne has not complied with 
the legal requirements for preserving his parental rights under Utah law." R. 144. It also 
held that "Osborne has failed to take any action according to the statutory requirements, 
and so has waived any right to Kenneth he may have otherwise had." R. 144. 
Osborne did not appeal this ruling, or even make good on his threat to 
further challenge the district court's in personam jurisdiction. Rather, on 
March 27, 2002, Osborne filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the action. R. 147-48. 
On March 8,2002, Adoption Center filed a separate Petition for 
Determination of Birth Father's Rights relating to the child. Pet. App. 20. This petition 
for determination was filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.24, which is part of 
the Utah adoption code and states that "[a]ny interested party may petition the court for a 
determination of the rights and interests of any person who may claim an interest in a 
child under this chapter." That petition was also filed pursuant to Utah's Declaratory 
Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 and 78-33-2. 
Because the district court ruled in the action brought by Osborne he had 
waived his rights to notice and consent, Adoption Center filed a motion to allow its 
petition to be heard without notice to Osborne.7 See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13. Pet. 
7When Adoption Center filed this petition, the district court had not yet ruled that 
Osborne had waived his notice and consent rights, so Adoption Center sent a copy of the 
petition for a determination of birth father's rights to Osborne's lawyer, along with a 
notice of the petition and an acceptance of service. See Pet. App. 21. Osborne's lawyer 
refused to accept service of this petition, but by so doing acknowledged that he had 
actual notice of the petition. Pet. App. 22. Shortly thereafter, the district court entered 
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App. 24. On or about March 29,2002, the district court granted Adoption Center's 
motion to proceed without notice, Pet. App. 29, and on or about April 8,2002, the 
district court entered an order finding that any person claiming to be the putative father 
of the child, including Frank Osborne, "is deemed to have waived and surrendered any 
right in relation to the minor child, including the right to notice of any judicial 
proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption 
of the child is not required." Pet. App. 31; Add. 4. This language essentially tracks Utah 
Code Ann. §78-30-4.14(5). 
Following his voluntary dismissal of his state court petition, Osborne filed 
a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging 
violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Pet. App. 32. Among other 
things, Osborne asked the federal court for injunctive relief to stay the state court 
adoption and determination of birth father rights proceedings. Id. fflf 32-34. On 
June 4, 2002, Adoption Center filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in the 
federal action, and as part of that filing included a copy of the state district court's 
April 8, 2002 ruling on Osborne's rights.8 Mand. Pet. at 11-12. 
its decision on the motion to quash and ruled that Osborne had waived his notice and 
consent rights regarding the adoption of the child. R. 141-46. 
8Osborne has made no effort in the state courts, including this Court, to have that 
ruling concerning Osborne's rights vacated, overruled, or otherwise changed. Osborne's 
petition for writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals only asked that he be able to raise 
his personal jurisdiction defense. Mand. Pet. at 1-3. 
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On June 18,2002, Osborne asked the federal court for a temporary 
restraining order to enjoin Adoption Center and the adoptive parents from finalizing the 
adoption. Pet. App. 34. At a hearing held June 21,2002, the federal court refused to 
grant Osborne's motion for a temporary restraining order. Mand. Pet. at 12. Osborne 
filed his Mandamus Petition in the Court of Appeals that same day.9 
On July 2,2002, the Court of Appeals denied Osborne's petition. The 
Court of Appeals ruled that "Petitioner has failed to establish he has met any of the[] 
requirements" of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) to establish any rights to the child. 
Add. 3. It also ruled that Osborne failed to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.15(4), which deal with non-resident birth fathers, because "he took absolutely 
no legal action in his home state of North Carolina for the five months prior to the 
mother's relinquishment." Add. 3 at 2. The Court of Appeals concluded that "Petitioner 
has simply failed to take any timely action to preserve his rights to this child." Id. 
The Court of Appeals also addressed Osborne's jurisdiction argument and 
found it to be without merit. It wrote: 
Regarding Petitioner's jurisdictional argument, the 
question of personal jurisdiction only arises when a defendant 
is called to defend an action in court. The district court did 
not need or attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
Petitioner. He lost his rights to the child by operation of law 
when he failed to take the statutory steps required to protect 
his rights. Furthermore, it is Petitioner, as a plaintiff, seeking 
relief in Utah courts who has invoked the jurisdiction of the 
Utah courts. The fact that court action, and the operation of 
9The Court of Appeals' file shows that Osborne's check for the filing fee was 
made out to the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
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law, affected the father's unprotected rights does not 
implicate personal jurisdiction. If Petitioner wants to protect 
and assert his rights in a child relinquished for adoption in 
Utah, he must take the necessary action to protect his rights 
under Utah law. He cannot simply stand on the "sidelines" 
and claim that Utah courts lack jurisdiction over him. 
Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted). 
Just prior to the ruling by the Court of Appeals, Osborne amended his 
paternity action in North Carolina to include Adoption Center and the adoptive parents as 
parties. Before the time for either to answer had passed, Osborne obtained first an ex 
parte temporary restraining order, and second an ex parte preliminary injunction. Pet. 
App. 37, 41. Both Adoption Center and the adoptive parents have moved to dismiss the 
claims pending against them in North Carolina for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted because 
there is no one against whom mandamus relief can issue. Osborne never asked a state 
district court to allow him to challenge the adoption without waiving personal 
jurisdiction. That question was only addressed to the federal district court prior to the 
commencement of the mandamus action in the Court of Appeals. As such, no one did 
anything or refused to do anything that the Court of Appeals could correct or compel. 
In any event, Osborne did not take appropriate steps under Utah law to 
establish his rights to the child. No one knows if he is even the father. Utah law applies 
when determining his rights because the adoption is pending here. Osborne did not file 
the necessary paternity action or notice of that action in Utah or take any action in North 
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Carolina prior to the relinquishment of the child by the mother and her husband, the legal 
father under North Carolina law. As such, he established no rights in the child. 
Under settled United States Supreme Court precedent, therefore, Osborne 
is not entitled to due process protections in conjunction with the adoption because, 
having failed to establish his rights, he is a nonparty to the adoption. The personal 
jurisdiction requirement derives from the due process clause, and is an individual liberty 
interest that can be waived and that does not restrict the sovereign power of a court. 
Because personal jurisdiction is a due process protection, Osborne is not in a position to 
demand that a Utah court have personal jurisdiction over him to finalize the adoption 
because he is not a party to the adoption, having failed to establish rights to the child. 
In any event, no court has ever recognized a right for someone to seek 
affirmative relief in a court without consenting to the personal jurisdiction of that court. 
In fact, it is settled law that seeking affirmative relief from a court means that one 
consents to the jurisdiction of that court. Utah is not required by the federal or state 
constitution to hold otherwise, and Utah is not required by the open courts provision of 
the Utah Constitution to create such a remedy. The open courts provision does not 
require the creation of new remedies. Thus, if Osborne desires to challenge the adoption 
in Utah, he will have to consent to jurisdiction. 
If personal jurisdiction over Osborne is required to finalize the adoption, 
the Utah court will have personal jurisdiction over him either because Osborne will 
consent to jurisdiction or under the status exception to minimum contacts. Utah is the 
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only place where a court will have subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption because 
the adoptive parents live in Utah. The United States Supreme Court has recognized an 
exception to minimum contacts when a state is adjudicating the status of a person within 
its jurisdiction. This status exception is well established and has been recognized in 
divorce, termination, custody, and adoption cases. Thus, a Utah court will have 
jurisdiction sufficient to finalize the adoption even absent minimum contacts by Osborne. 
Finally, a ruling for Osborne would be a disaster-in-the-making. By ruling 
that personal jurisdiction is required over every nonresident putative father who has not 
established his rights to a child and that the status exception to minimum contacts does 
not apply, interstate adoptions in Utah would be brought to a standstill and thousands of 
already finalized adoptions would be open to question. A judgment entered without 
personal jurisdiction where personal jurisdiction is required is null and void. Thus, no 
one will want to finalize an adoption in Utah if any putative father is a nonresident, even 
if that putative father has failed to protect his rights. And, if adoption decrees are not 
binding as to a nonresident putative father, any adoption decree already entered involving 
such a putative father would no longer be final and would become subject to challenge. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS 
IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED BECAUSE THERE IS NO ONE 
AGAINST WHOM MANDAMUS RELIEF CAN ISSUE. 
Osborne asked the Court of Appeals to order that he be allowed to either 
intervene in or challenge the adoption of the child without waiving his defense of lack of 
personal jurisdiction. Mand. Pet. at 1. His petition was directed to every district court in 
the state. Mand. Pet. at 1. Osborne did not, however, first present the issue to a district 
court and, therefore, mandamus relief is not available to him.10 
A. When Reviewing the Court of Appeals' Decision, This Court 
Must Examine Whether Mandamus Relief Was Appropriate, 
On certiorari, the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision turns on 
whether that court accurately performed its functions. State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ^  6, 
46 P.3d 230, 232 ("[Correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that 
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of 
review."). In other words, the question here is still whether Osborne is entitled to 
mandamus relief. In determining whether to grant mandamus, the Court of Appeals was 
supposed to "look at the nature of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged in the 
petition, and the purpose of the type of writ sought in deciding whether to grant 
extraordinary relief." Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995) 
I0On Adoption Center's motion to quash, Osborne argued that the district court 
did not have personal jurisdiction to rule on Osborne's rights. Pet. App. 14, 16. But, he 
never argued that he had a right to intervene in or challenge the adoption without 
consenting to personal jurisdiction. In any event, he voluntarily dismissed the district 
court action and has never challenged that Court's ruling concerning his rights. 
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(emphasis added). Had it done so, it would have realized that mandamus relief was not 
appropriate. 
B. Mandamus Relief Is Available Only To Compel Certain Actions 
Or To Correct A Gross Abuse of Discretion. 
Rule 65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs 
extraordinary writs seeking mandamus relief, provides that: 
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior 
court... has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion; (B) where an inferior court... has failed to 
perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or 
station; [or] (C) where an inferior court... has refused the 
petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to 
which the petitioner is entitled . . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d) (emphasis added). 
The parameters of mandamus relief have been further defined by case law. 
'The common law writ of mandamus was designed to compel a person to perform a legal 
duty incumbent on him by virtue of his office or as required by law." Renn, 904 P.2d 
at 682. "The writ was initially available to compel the performance of a nondiscretionary 
duty and to '"compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, 
but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way.'" Id. (quoting 
State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 218,429 P.2d 969, 970 (1967) (which quoted 34 Am. 
Jur. Mandamus § 4)). "In modern times, that writ has also been expanded so that it can 
be used to correct gross abuses of discretion." Renn, 904 P.2d at 682. In any event, 
"extraordinary writs are available only when there is no 'plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy' at law." Id. (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a)). 
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C. Mandamus Relief Was Not Available to Osborne In the Court of 
Appeals. 
It is difficult to see how any of the purposes for a writ of mandamus would 
serve Osborne's needs. His request was directed against all district courts in the state, 
Mand. Pet. at 1, but no district court resisted or refused Osborne's request to intervene in 
or challenge the adoption without waiving personal jurisdiction because he did not raise 
the issue with any of them. He only raised the issue in federal court. Before the Court of 
Appeals could compel a district court to allow Osborne to so intervene or challenge the 
adoption, the district court would have had to refuse to let him do so. See Angel I v. Sixth 
Judicial Dist. Court, 656 P.2d 405, 407 (Utah 1982) (mandamus available to correct 
district court's refusal to transfer venue where plaintiff was clearly entitled to transfer); 
Garcia v. Jones, 29 Utah 2d 409, 411,510 P.2d 1099, 1100 (1973) ("To be entitled to 
the issuance of the writ, petitioner had to prove that the State Division of Family Services 
had a clear statutory duty to perform certain acts and refused to do so." (Emphasis 
added)); Archerv. Utah State Land Bd.9 15 Utah 2d 321, 323, 392 P.2d 622, 623 (1964) 
(mandamus available where "administrative board or officer has a clear statutory duty to 
perform a certain act and it or he refuses to do so." (Emphasis added)). See also 
Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning & Zoning Comm yn, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 
1983) (mandamus not available because plaintiff bypassed available administrative 
remedies); Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P.2d 331, 333 (Utah 1980) (same as Merrihew); 
State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 920-21 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (district court must first 
exceed its jurisdiction or grossly abuse its discretion before mandamus is available). 
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Because Osborne did not present the issue first to a district court, there was 
nothing for the Court of Appeals to compel or correct. Nowhere has Osborne 
demonstrated that a district court exceeded its jurisdiction or committed a gross abuse of 
discretion. No district court has failed to perform a nondiscretionary function, no district 
court has refused to exercise discretion, and no district court has committed a gross abuse 
of discretion that the Court of Appeals could have compelled or corrected through 
issuance of a writ of mandamus. The only court that refused Osborne any relief was the 
federal district court, yet the Utah Court of Appeals has no power over the federal court. 
Mandamus relief simply is not appropriate or available in this case. 
Osborne also did not demonstrate that he had no plain, speedy, or adequate 
remedy at law. He undoubtedly will argue that he could not have intervened in or 
challenged the adoption in district court without waiving his personal jurisdiction 
defense or that he did not know where the adoption was filed. He points to In re B.B.D., 
1999 UT 70, 984 P.2d 967, as the reason why he could not raise the issue in district 
court. The birth father in that case was found to have waived his personal jurisdiction 
defense when he "voluntarily invoked and submitted to the jurisdiction of Utah." Id. 
Tf 28, 984 P.2d at 973. B.B.D., however, does not say whether the putative father raised 
the personal jurisdiction question in district court. Thus, we do not know what the 
outcome would have been if Osborne had tried to raise the issue in district court. 
Osborne had a chance to raise the issue with the district court in the action 
he filed there, but he did not do so. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.24 ("[a]ny interested 
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party may petition the court for a determination of the rights and interests of any person 
who may claim an interest in a child under this chapter....")• He did argue that the 
district court did not have jurisdiction over him to determine his rights. Pet. App. 14, 16. 
Yet, he did not assert there the right that he asserts now, and he dismissed that action 
after the district court ruled he had waived his rights to the child. R. 147-48. He did not 
appeal that ruling, but ran to federal court. As a result, the Court of Appeals had no state 
court judge to whom it could direct a writ of mandamus. The writ of certiorari to the 
Court of Appeals should be dismissed, or the Court of Appeals should be instructed to 
dismiss the Mandamus Petition. 
II. OSBORNE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS RIGHTS AND IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO FURTHER DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS. 
Osborne assumes for purposes of his entire brief that he is in no different 
position than a father who has fully developed parental rights. This key assumption, 
however, is not true. The level of constitutional rights an unwed putative father has is 
conditioned upon what the putative father has done to grasp his position as father and to 
secure and develop those rights. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that 
a state can, consistent with due process, require an unwed father to take specific 
affirmative steps to establish his rights to a child. Osborne raises the personal 
jurisdiction argument only because his efforts to secure and establish his parental rights 
fall short of what Utah law requires, and he hopes to avoid a ruling to that effect. He 
cannot avoid it, however. He did not establish any rights related to the child, and a Utah 
court can finalize the adoption. 
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A. Lehr v. Robertson Establishes the Analytical Framework for 
Determining the Nature of Osborne's Rights. 
The benchmark case defining the rights of an unwed putative father is Lehr 
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983). The issue in Lehr was under what 
circumstances due process entitled an unwed father to notice and a hearing before his 
child could be adopted. Lehr applies in this case because the requirement of personal 
jurisdiction also springs from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2104 (1982) ('The requirement that a court have personal 
jurisdiction flows not from Art. Ill, but from the Due Process Clause."). 
Importantly, the personal jurisdiction requirement "represents a restriction 
on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual 
liberty." Id. (Emphasis added.) For this reason, "the test for personal jurisdiction 
requires that 'the maintenance of the suit... not offend "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice."'" Id. at 702-03, 102 S. Ct. at 2104 (quoting International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154,158 (1945) (which quoted Milliken 
v. Meyer ,311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 342 (1940))). And, "[b]ecause the 
requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like 
other such rights,, be waived," Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 703, 102 S. Ct. at 2105 
(emphasis added). 
The birth father in Lehr had not taken the affirmative steps required under 
New York law to entitle him to notice of an adoption proceeding, such as filing a notice 
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with the state's birth father registry. The court noted the differences between an unwed 
father and a father who has otherwise demonstrated a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood and said "the mere existence of a biological link does not 
merit equivalent constitutional protection." 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S. Ct. at 2993. Because 
the birth father had not followed New York's statute for establishing his rights, the court 
in Lehr was "not assessing the constitutional adequacy of New York's procedures for 
terminating a developed relationship," like Osborne assumes he has in this case, but 
rather "whether New York has adequately protected [the birth father's] opportunity to 
form such a relationship." Id. at 262-63, 103 S. Ct. at 2994 (emphasis added). In other 
words, the putative father in Lehr had not established rights to the child, and the only 
question was whether he had an adequate chance to do so. 
The court further stated: 
The significance of the biological connection is that it 
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male 
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he 
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of 
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the 
blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely 
valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails 
to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically 
compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child's 
best interest lie. 
Id. at 262, 103 S. Ct. at 2993-94 (emphasis added). Thus, consistent with due process, a 
state can require an unwed father to take specific affirmative steps to establish his rights 
to a child, and if he does not establish such rights, the state does not have to even listen 
to the unwed father. 
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The court examined the New York statute and found that it met due process 
requirements for allowing a putative father the chance to establish parental rights. It 
concluded: 
The legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of 
young children and having the adoption proceeding 
completed expeditiously that underlie the entire statutory 
scheme also justify a trial judge's determination to require all 
interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural 
requirements of the statute. The Constitution does not 
require either a trial judge or a litigant to give special notice 
to nonparties who are presumptively capable of asserting 
and protecting their own rights. 
Id. at 265, 103 S. Ct at 2995 (emphasis added). 
It is quite telling that the unwed father in Lehr was termed a "nonparty" 
because he had not complied with the affirmative statutory requirements for establishing 
rights to the child. Lehr teaches that so long as a state provides a mechanism, consistent 
with due process, for a putative father to establish his rights to a child, if the father does 
not "adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of that mechanism, no additional 
due process safeguards, such as notice of and participation in an adoption proceeding are 
required. Nonparties do not need due process safeguards. 
Personal jurisdiction, like notice, is a due process safeguard. See Insurance 
Corp., 456 U.S. at 702-03, 102 S. Ct. at 2104-05 (personal jurisdiction is an individual 
liberty interest derived from the due process clause). Thus, if a putative father has not 
properly established rights to a child and, therefore, is not entitled to further due process 
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protections because he is a nonparty, it would not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice to finalize an adoption of the child without his participation. 
Few cases have considered the question directly, but ironically one court 
that has addressed the issue is the North Carolina Court of Appeals, from Osborne's 
home state. In In re Baby Boy Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 435 S.E.2d 352 (1993), that 
court, relying upon the principles stated in Lehr, concluded that "'traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice' are not offended by permitting the petitioner to proceed 
with terminating the father's parental rights [or finalizing the adoption] in the absence of 
his minimum contacts with this State " 112 N.C. App. at 252, 435 S.E.2d at 354. 
The father in Dixon, a resident of Virginia, had not followed procedures required by 
North Carolina law to establish his rights. Because he had not, the court said it was 
appropriate to terminate his rights. See also In re Williams, 563 S.E.2d 202 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2002) (minimum contacts of Pennsylvania unwed father not required to terminate 
his rights in North Carolina).11 
nThe distinction the U.S. Supreme Court made in Lehr—between terminating a 
developed parental relationship and finalizing an adoption where the unwed father has 
not established his rights—is important in this case. All of the cases and commentary 
Osborne cites that support his position on personal jurisdiction are cases where there is a 
"developed" parental relationship. Both Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), 
and May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), were cases between divorced parents. 
Lassiterv. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981), involved 
the termination of a mother's rights to her child, something very different from the rights 
of an unwed putative father. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16, 103 S. Ct. at 2992 n.16. 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982), involved the termination of 
the rights of married parents to their three children. The whole point of Lehr was that 
the rights of married parents and unwed putative fathers are very different. See 463 U.S. 
at 256-57, 260 n.16, 103 S. Ct. at 2991, 2992 n.16. The Wasserman article Osborne 
refers to so heavily does not even talk about personal jurisdiction in the adoption context. 
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The question under Lehr then becomes whether Osborne did those things 
that were required to establish rights. Whether he did turns on Utah law, not North 
Carolina law. 
B. Utah Law Governs the Issue of Whether Osborne Established 
His Right to Constitutional Protections. 
Whether Osborne established the kind of relationship that acquires 
Fourteenth Amendment protections is determined by Utah law because that is where the 
adoption is pending. "A court applies its own local law in determining whether to grant 
an adoption." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 289 (1971). This rule is 
universally applied by state courts when determining an out-of-state birth parent's rights 
in an adoption proceeding. 
See, e.g., In re Adoption ofC.L. W.9 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985) (Florida law determined revocation rights of Pennsylvania birth mother who 
signed consent in Pennsylvania); B.G. v. H.S., 509 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) 
(Florida birth father required to follow Indiana procedures to protect his rights); In re 
Adoption of Baby Boy S, 32 Kan. App. 2d 119, 912 P.2d 761 (1996) (Kansas law applied 
to determine rights of Ohio birth father where adoption was finalized in Kansas); In re 
Petition to Adopt C.M.A., 557 N.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (despite 
Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. 111. L. Rev. 
813. Osborne also argues that one Utah case is similar to this case, State in the Interest 
ofW.A., 2002 UT App. 72, cert granted sub norn., In re W.A., 48 P.3d 979 (Utah 2002) 
(Table), which is currently under advisement with this Court for decision. W.A., 
however, is also different because it is a termination of parental rights case involving a 
father who had established parental rights. 
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paternity proceeding in New Hampshire, notice and consent rights of New Hampshire 
birth father determined by Minnesota law); In re Baby Boy Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 
435 S.E.2d 352 (1993) (discussed above); In re Adoption of ILK, 111 P.2d 915 (Okla. 
1987) (Oklahoma law applied to non-resident birth mother); Stubbs v. Weathersby, 126 
Or. App. 596, 869 P.2d 893, 898-99 (1994) (Oregon law determined revocation rights of 
Washington birth mother who signed consent in Washington); Burns v. Crenshaw, 84 
Or. App. 257, 733 P.2d 922 (1987) (Oregon law determined notice requirements for 
Washington birth father); In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 980-81 (Wyo. 1982) 
(Wyoming law determined New York birth mother's revocation rights, even though 
consent was taken in New York). 
Some of these cases merit discussion because they show clearly that the 
rights of the birth parents are determined by the law of the state where the adoption is 
pending, not the birth parent's home state. In Burns v. Crenshaw, 84 Or. App. 257, 733 
P.2d 922 (1987), the natural mother and father were from Washington. The birth father 
filed a filiation proceeding in Washington nearly two months before the baby was born. 
He thought the mother might leave to go to Oregon, so he obtained an ex parte temporary 
restraining order barring her from leaving Yakima County or placing the baby for 
adoption. The birth mother, however, moved to Oregon, delivered her baby, and placed 
it for adoption. The birth father did nothing to comply with Oregon law to protect his 
rights, such as filing notice of the initiation of the Washington filiation proceeding in 
Oregon. Because Oregon law was not complied with, and even though the birth father 
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was from Washington, the court held that the putative father was not entitled to notice of 
the adoption proceedings. Id. at 261-62, 733 P.2d at 923-24. 
In In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982), the birth mother 
executed her consent to adoption in New York, where the child had been born. Before 
the adoptive parents got back to Wyoming to file a petition for adoption, the birth mother 
declared the revocation of her consent. New York law allowed revocation, but Wyoming 
law did not, absent fraud or duress. The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that Wyoming 
law applied and affirmed a final adoption decree. 652 P.2d at 979-81. 
In Stubbs v. Weathersby, 126 Or. App. 596, 869 P.2d 893, 898-99 (1994), 
the birth mother signed a consent in Washington for a couple from Oregon to adopt her 
child, which had been bom in Washington. The adoption proceedings were filed in 
Oregon. The consent the birth mother signed apparently was not valid in Washington 
because it did not meet certain formalities required by Washington law. The consent, 
however, met all formalities required by Oregon law. Even though the consent had been 
signed in Washington and for a child bom in Washington, the Oregon court held that 
Oregon law applied to whether the consent was valid. 869 P.2d at 898-99. 
This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have followed this rule in the 
past and have applied Utah law to determine the rights of out-of-state birth fathers.12 
12The application of the rule that the law of the forum where the adoption is 
pending is applied sometimes means a birth parent has more rights in the state where the 
adoption is pending than he or she would have had in his or her home state. See, e.g., In 
re Female Infant F, 191 A.D.2d437, 594N.Y.S.2d303 (1993); mdln re Adoption of 
Baby Boy £>., 769 A.2d 508 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2001) (in both cases the state where the 
adoption was pending provided more rights for the birth parent than his or her home 
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See, e.g., In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, 984 P.2d 967 (Utah law applied to 
Washington birth father); In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(Utah law applied to Indiana father's rights). Under this rule, Utah law will apply to 
determine whether Osborne took the steps required to protect his rights.13 
C. Osborne Did Not Establish His Rights Under Utah Law. 
This Court discussed what an out-of-state putative father must do to 
establish his rights under Utah law in In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, 984 P.2d 
967. Under Utah law, Osborne has not established any rights to the child, thus he is not 
entitled to further due process safeguards, including a personal jurisdiction defense, 
because he is not a party to the adoption. 
1. Strict Compliance With the Putative Father Provisions Is 
Required to Establish Rights. 
This Court wrote in B.B.D.: 
Under Utah law, "an unmarried biological father has 
an inchoate interest that acquires constitutional protection 
only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to 
state's laws). 
13Osborne's argument that North Carolina law should apply to the adoption and 
the adoption should be done in North Carolina simply is not supported or even possible. 
Osborne cites no authority in support. Osborne argues that the adoptive family should be 
required to go to North Carolina to finalize the adoption because Utah courts do not have 
jurisdiction over him. This would not work, however, because no North Carolina court 
could have jurisdiction over an adoption petition brought by an adoptive family living in 
Utah. North Carolina law requires that the adoptive family be domiciled in North 
Carolina to file an adoption petition. See N.C. Code Ann. § 48-2-100. Because North 
Carolina could not entertain the adoption proceeding even if it wanted to, under the 
conflicts of law principle discussed above, North Carolina law also will not apply to the 
adoption. 
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the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy 
and upon the child's birth." An unmarried father 
demonstrates his commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood "by providing appropriate medical care and 
financial support, and by establishing legal paternity, in 
accordance with the requirements of [Utah law]." If an 
unmarried father fails to adhere to these requirements, 
including taking the necessary steps to establish paternity, 
"his biological parental interest may be lost entirely, or 
greatly diminished in constitutional significance by his failure 
to timely exercise it, or by his failure to strictly comply with 
the available legal steps to substantiate it" 
1999 UT 70, If 11, 984 P.2d at 970 (bold and underscore emphasis added; citations 
omitted; italics and brackets in original). 
Among other statutory requirements, the unmarried biological father of a 
child younger than six months old at the time of placement14 must (1) "initiate 
proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on 
Paternity"; (2) "file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with the state 
registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health"; and (3) "if he had actual 
knowledge of the pregnancy, pa[y] a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred 
in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.14(2)(b). Importantly, all of these conditions must be performed by the 
unmarried birth father "prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or 
relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency." Id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) 
(emphasis added). 
14The child in this case was placed for adoption before he was five months old. 
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An unmarried biological father is "deemed" to have "waived and 
surrendered any right in relation to [his] child... including the right to notice of any 
judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child" if he does not "fully 
and strictly comply" with these and other statutory requirements prior to relinquishment. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5) (emphasis added). If these conditions are not met, 
moreover, "his consent to the adoption of the child is not required." Id. 
In other words, an unmarried natural father only acquires rights entitling 
him to additional due process protection if he first follows the mandates of the statute. 
The Lehr court found that requiring a putative father to take affirmative steps, such as 
these, is consistent with due process, and that a putative father is "presumptively capable 
of asserting and protecting [his] own rights." 463 U.S. at 265, 103 S. Ct. at 2995. If he 
does not follow the required steps, he never acquires those rights, and the Lehr court 
called the putative father in that case a "nonparty." Id. A nonparty is not entitled to due 
process safeguards. 
The Washington birth father in B.B.D. did not do the things he was 
required to do by the Utah adoption code to protect his rights. As a result, this Court 
wrote "that he has lost any parental right or interest to B.B.D." 1999 UT 70,112, 984 
P.2d at 970. Certainly, someone who has "lost any parental right or interest" to the child 
to be adopted would be a nonparty. 
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2. Osborne Failed to Establish His Rights. 
Like the birth father in B.B.D., Osborne did not take any of the steps 
required under Utah law to establish any parental right or interest to the child. Osborne 
did not file a paternity action in Utah or register notice of that paternity action with the 
State Registrar of Vital Statistics. R. 67. Based on this, the Fourth District Court 
concluded—in the motion to quash proceeding to which Osborne was a party—that 
"Frank Osborne has not complied with the legal requirements for preserving his parental 
rights under Utah law," and that "Osborne has failed to take any action according to the 
statutory requirements, and so has waived any right to Kenneth he may have otherwise 
had." R. 144. Osborne did not appeal this ruling or otherwise seek to have it vacated, 
even in his petition for writ of mandamus. 
Later, that same court ruled that Osborne "is deemed to have waived and 
surrendered any right in relation to the minor child, including the right to notice of any 
judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the 
adoption of the child is not required." Add. 4. Osborne has also done nothing to appeal 
or set aside this ruling.15 
15Osborne claims he would be entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding in 
North Carolina. This is not true, however, because this ruling and the earlier ruling by 
the Utah district court effectively terminated his parental rights. Therefore, under N.C. 
Code Ann. § 48-3»603(a)(l), his consent would not be required to finalize an adoption in 
North Carolina. In any event, the adoption cannot be done in North Carolina because the 
adoptive parents live in Utah. Thus, Utah law, not North Carolina law, will apply to the 
adoption and determine his rights to notice. 
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3. The Unknowing Nonresident Putative Father Provisions 
Do Not Apply to Osborne And, In Any Event, He Did Not 
Comply With Them. 
The birth father in B.B.D. also argued that the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4), which apply to out-of-state birth fathers who "do[] not know or 
have reason to know that the mother is residing in the state of Utah," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.15(4)(c), should apply to him because he was from Washington. This Court 
disagreed because the birth father knew the mother was in Utah and may place the child 
for adoption. 1999 UT 70, ffij 31-32, 984 P.2d at 974. These provisions also do not 
apply to Osbome because he knew the mother had contacted an adoption agency in Utah 
one month before the child's birth, and that she came to Utah to give birth and to place 
the child for adoption. Mand. Pet. at 4, 6; R. 36-38, ffif 9-11, 23. 
Yet, if the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) applied, Osborne 
did not comply with them. To establish his rights under Section 78-30-4.15(4), an 
unmarried birth father must comply "with the most stringent and complete 
requirements of the state where the mother previously resided or was located, in order to 
protect and preserve his parental interest and right in the child in cases of adoption." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4)(d) (emphasis added). Osborne never has had any 
"parental interest" in the child under North Carolina law because the mother was married 
to someone else when she had the child. R. 69-70. 
In North Carolina, as in many other states, when a child is bom to a 
married woman, like the birth mother in this case, her husband is presumed by the law to 
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be the child's father. Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217, 13 S.E.2d 224,226 (1941) ("child born 
of a married woman was presumed legitimate"); Rosero v. Blake, 563 S.E.2d 248, 252 
(N.C. Ct. App.) ("When a child is born to a married woman, her husband is legally 
presumed to be the child's father."), writ allowed, 356 N.C. 166, 568 S.E.2d 610 (2002). 
This presumption cannot be overcome by a person claiming to be the "real" father unless 
that person first files a legitimation proceeding and proves paternity by "clear and 
convincing evidence." N.C. Code Ann. § 49-12.1. Until such a finding is made by a 
court, a putative father of a child born to a married woman is not entitled to any 
recognition as the father of the child. See Rosero, 563 S.E.2d at 252-53. 
The birth mother in this case was married when the child was born, and the 
child was even given the last name of the husband. R. 69-70, 72. Thus, under North 
Carolina law, the husband was the legal father of the child. Osborne did not file a 
legitimation proceeding in North Carolina prior to the birth mother's and her husband's 
relinquishments to Adoption Center, even though the birth mother had refused to execute 
two different voluntary declarations of paternity naming Osborne as the father. R. 69-70, 
74-75, 36. As such, the only legal parents the child ever had under North Carolina 
law—the birth mother and her husband—both relinquished the child to Adoption Center 
before Osborne formally made any attempt to claim paternity.16 Thus, Osborne did not 
16Osborne's paternity proceeding in North Carolina does not comply with N.C. 
Code Ann. § 49-12.1 for proving he is the real father of the child. That section requires 
that the mother's spouse and the child be made parties to the proceeding and that the 
child be appointed a guardian ad litem. Osborne has not satisfied either of these 
requirements. See Pet. App. 37. 
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do what he could have done under North Carolina law to establish paternity as required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4). 
D. Osborne Is Not Entitled to Due Process Safeguards Because He 
Did Not Establish Rights to the Child, 
The Lehr court indicated that by failing to establish his rights, the birth 
father in that case was a nonparty to the adoption and was not entitled to the further due 
process right of notice of the adoption. See 463 U.S. at 265, 103 S. Ct. at 2995. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5) provides that by failing to follow the provisions of the 
adoption code to establish his rights, Osborne "waived and surrendered any right in 
relation to [his] child... including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in 
connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is 
not required." (Emphasis added.) The personal jurisdiction defense Osborne claims is 
an individual liberty interest—i.e., a right—founded upon the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702,102 S. Ct. 2099, 2104 (1982). Like notice, it is subject to 
waiver. Id. at 703, 102 S. Ct. at 2105. 
Osborne failed to establish any rights related to the child and, therefore, is 
not entitled to further due process safeguards under Lehr or under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.14(5). He is a "nonparty," 463 U.S. at 265, 103 S. Ct. at 2995, and personal 
jurisdiction is, therefore, not an issue. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly that Osborne 
did not establish his rights to the child and that personal jurisdiction was not an issue. 
That decision should be affirmed. 
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E, The Utah Putative Father Provisions Are Constitutional on 
Their Face and as Applied. 
While claiming to argue only that he should be allowed to intervene and 
assert his personal jurisdiction defense, Pet. Br. at 49, Osborne suggests throughout his 
brief that the putative father provisions of the Utah adoption code are unconstitutional, 
either on their face or as applied to him. This Court held, however, in In re Adoption of 
B.B.D., that these provisions of the Utah adoption code satisfied both due process and 
equal protection concerns. 1999 UT 70, fflf 13-21, 984 P.2d at 970-72. See also Judge 
Wilkins' opinion in In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(provisions of adoption code cutting off rights of unmarried Indiana birth father did not 
violate due process). Thus, these provisions are constitutional on their face. 
They are also constitutional as applied to Osborne. The putative father 
provisions are only unconstitutional as applied "when it is impossible for the father to 
file the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his 
own" Ellis v. Social Servs. Dept, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980). If it is impossible 
for the father to comply, "due process requires that he be permitted to show that he was 
not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute." Id. A reasonable 
opportunity to comply is only required after a finding that it was impossible for the birth 
father to comply, through no fault of his own, at the time required. Wells v. Children's 
Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 208 (Utah 1983). 
Osborne, by his own admission, was aware of the need to establish his 
rights before the birth mother and her husband relinquished their rights, and it was not 
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impossible for him to do so. The birth mother initially contacted a Utah agency in 
July, 2001, and came to Utah in August, 2001, to deliver the child and place it for 
adoption. R. 37-38, fH 9-11. Osborne did nothing then to establish his rights. Later, the 
birth mother twice refused to execute voluntary declarations of paternity. R. 36, ^ f 18. 
Again, he did nothing under North Carolina or Utah law to establish his rights. The birth 
mother left Osborne on or about December 10, 2001, and it was not until 25 days later 
that she placed the child for adoption with Adoption Center. R. 35-36, fflf 20, 25. 
During this interim, Osborne again did nothing to establish his rights. 
Moreover, under North Carolina law, because the birth mother was 
married, her husband was considered the legal father of the child, not Osborne. Rosero 
v. Blake, 563 S.E.2d 248, 252 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) ("When a child is born to a married 
woman, her husband is legally presumed to be the child's father."). This presumption 
cannot be overcome by Osborne except by filing a legitimation proceeding in court and 
proving paternity by "clear and convincing evidence." N.C. Code Ann. § 49-12.1. 
Osborne is presumed to know the law. Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 
755 (Utah 1984) (birth father in that case was "presumed to know the law" for purposes 
of a constitutionality analysis). 
Osborne was on notice that the law did not consider him the father, that the 
birth mother was considering adoption and had refused to allow him to voluntarily 
declare his paternity, and thus that he needed to establish his rights. It was not 
impossible for him to do so. Yet, he waited until more than one month after the child 
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had been placed for adoption to bring a paternity action in North Carolina, and he never 
has done anything required in Utah to protect his rights. Thus, the putative father 
provisions are constitutional as applied to Osborne. He failed to establish his rights and 
he is not entitled to any additional due process safeguards. 
III. NO COURT HAS EVER RECOGNIZED A RIGHT TO SEEK 
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF WITHOUT CONSENTING TO 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION, AND NO SUCH RIGHT EXISTS. 
Osborne asked the Court of Appeals to, among other things, order that he 
be entitled to intervene or bring a collateral action to challenge the adoption "on 
jurisdictional grounds without waiving any personal jurisdictional defense." Mand. Pet. 
at 3. Had Osborne done what he needed to do to establish his rights, he would not be 
afraid of invoking the powers of a Utah court and submitting himself to personal 
jurisdiction. In fact, he likely would be pounding on the courthouse door, anxious to 
assert his developed parental rights. It is only because he did not establish his rights that 
he had to create this issue. 
It is settled law that a person submits himself to the jurisdiction of a Utah 
court by voluntarily demanding justice in that court. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 
67-68 (1938). Such jurisdiction is the "price which the state may exact as the condition 
for opening its courts to the plaintiff." Id. This makes sense because personal 
jurisdiction is rooted in individual liberty interests and, as such, is something that may be 
waived. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 
U.S. 694, 703, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2105 (1982). Utah is not required by the federal 
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constitution to permit Osborne, or any other person, to seek relief from one of its courts 
without consenting to personal jurisdiction. No state is required to provide such a 
remedy. Id. at 704, 102 S. Ct. at 2105 ("[T]he Court has upheld state procedures which 
find constructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the state court in the voluntary 
use of certain state procedures."). 
Requiring a putative father to come forward and assert his own rights is 
also consistent with Lehr, where the court said a state could require an unwed putative 
father to take specific affirmative steps to establish his rights regarding a child. 463 U.S. 
at 262, 265, 103 S. Ct. at 2993-95. Osborne thinks he can stand on the sidelines and play 
the game without going on the field. Under Lehr, he cannot. Lehr requires that he 
"adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) 
or he is not a party to the adoption. Id. at 265, 103 S. Ct. at 2995. 
Likewise, neither of the state constitutional provisions Osborne quotes 
requires that he be allowed to challenge an adoption in Utah without the courts of Utah 
exercising jurisdiction over him. He cites the Utah due process and open courts 
provisions, Utah Constitution, article I, §§ 7 and 11, saying he has a right of access to the 
courts and to have his day in court. Pet. Br. at 47-48. Osborne's Utah due process 
argument fails for the same reason the federal courts hold that asserting one's rights in 
court waives personal jurisdiction, and because Lehr held that a putative father could be 
required to take affirmative steps to establish his rights. 
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Osborne's open courts argument fails because he has a right of access to 
Utah courts to challenge the adoption. Osborne asks this Court to create a new right for 
him to challenge the adoption without his consenting to personal jurisdiction. Yet, no 
such right has ever been recognized by a state or federal court. The open courts 
provision does not require this Court to create new remedies. Burton v. Exam Center 
Ind. & Gen. Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, H 18, 994 P.2d 1261, 1267 ("[N]early 
eighty-five years ago this court held that where no right of action is given or no remedy 
exists under either the common law or statute, this section creates none."). 
Osborne also cites for the first time Article 1, § 24 of the Utah Constitution, 
the uniform operation of laws provision, but he did not raise section 24 in the Court of 
Appeals. In any event, the uniform operation of laws provision does not require that 
Osborne be allowed to seek affirmative relief in a court without consenting to personal 
jurisdiction. Everyone who seeks affirmative relief in a court consents to personal 
jurisdiction. Adam, 303 U.S. at 67-68. This rule operates uniformly as to all persons. 
IV. THE UTAH COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO FINALIZE THE 
ADOPTION. 
A. Utah Courts Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-7(1) provides that "[ajdoption proceedings shall 
be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district court... in the district 
where the person adopting resides." No other court has jurisdiction over the adoption 
because the adoptive family in this case resides in Utah. The adoption cannot be 
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finalized in North Carolina because North Carolina law requires that the adoptive parents 
live in North Carolina. N.C. Code Ann. § 48-2-100. 
These laws are consistent with the general rule stated in the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 78 (1971): 
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to grant an 
adoption if 
(a) it is the state of domicil of either the adopted child or the 
adoptive parent, and 
(b) the adoptive parent and either the adoptive child or the 
person having legal custody of the child are subject to its 
personal jurisdiction. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 78 (1971). 
Comment a to section 78 recognizes that the interests of a natural parent are 
affected by an adoption, but also states that if jurisdiction to grant an adoption were 
confined only to cases where the state has personal jurisdiction over all persons whose 
interests will be affected, including natural parents, "[t]his would be undesirable." Id. 
Comment a. Some adoptions, like this one, would also be impossible because no state 
has jurisdiction over all affected persons. Yet, because the paramount issue in an 
adoption is the best interests of the child, "[cjourts sitting in either the state of domicil of 
the child or in that of the adoptive parents will normally be equally well situated to 
determine such issues." Id. 
The adoptive parents in this case are from Utah as is Adoption Center, 
which has legal custody of the child. The child was born in Utah and has lived here now 
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for almost 11 months. The child is also a Utah domicil because the natural mother and 
her husband, the only legal father he has had, relinquished the child to Adoption Center 
and the child has been placed with a Utah family. See In re Adoption ofHalloway, 732 
P.2d 962, 966 (Utah 1986) (when a child is relinquished for adoption "the child acquires 
the domicile of the party who stands in loco parentis to him or her and with whom he or 
she lives at the time of abandonment"). Thus, the Utah court has jurisdiction to grant an 
adoption. 
B. If Personal Jurisdiction Is Required Over a Putative Father 
Who Has Failed to Establish Rights, the Status Exception to 
Minimum Contacts Protects the Interests of Children Placed for 
Adoption. 
If personal jurisdiction over Osborne is required even though he failed to 
establish his rights, the status exception to minimum contacts allows a Utah court to 
exercise such jurisdiction. Utah has subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption, but 
Osborne claims that Utah cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Yet, North 
Carolina would not have subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption because the 
adoptive parents do not live there, and it would not have personal jurisdiction over the 
adoptive family. If the adoption cannot be finalized because of these circumstances, the 
child is the one who suffers. 
The Court has been fully briefed on the status exception in State in the 
Interest ofW.A.9 2002 UT App. 72, cert, granted sub norn., In re W.A., 48 P.3d 979 
(Utah 2002) (Table). This Court heard oral arguments in the W.A. case on 
September 6, 2002, and the case is currently under advisement. As indicated earlier, 
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Adoption Center views W.A. as a different kind of case because it involved termination 
of the parental rights of a father who had established parental rights in his child, unlike 
Osborne. Because the Court has been fully advised on the issue, Adoption Center will 
only briefly review it. 
In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Supreme Court noted an 
exception to the usual minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction: "We do not 
suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as the 
particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the standard 
of fairness." A/, at 208 n.30. 
The Shaffer court further stated: 
Pennoyer [v. Neff] itself recognized that its rigid 
categories . . . could not accommodate some necessary 
litigation. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Field's opinion carefully 
noted that cases involving the personal status of the plaintiff, 
such as divorce actions, could be adjudicated in the plaintiffs 
home State even though the defendant could not be served 
within that State. 
433 U.S. at 201. 
The status exception to minimum contacts has long been recognized in the 
divorce context. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942); Maynard v. 
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 209 (1888) (upholding a legislative divorce entered by a territory in 
which only one spouse resided). Thus, due process is not violated by entry of a divorce 
decree binding on a nonresident spouse as long as one spouse is domiciled in the issuing 
state. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544 (1948). 
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The status exception has also been recognized by several states in parental 
rights termination proceedings. In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 543 P.2d 454,459 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E. 2d 107 (Ind. App. 1982), 
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983); In reM.L.K., 768 P.2d 316, 319 (Kan. App. 1984); 
Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Mont. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1071 
(1980); In re Adoption ofCopeland, 43 S.W.3d 483,486-87 (Term. Ct. App. 2000), 
appeal denied April 16, 2001; White v. Blake, 859 S.W.2d 551, 563 (Tex. App. 1993); 
Hudson v. Hudson, 670 P.2d 287 (Wash. App. 1983); A.E.H v. C.C., 468 N.W.2d 190, 
198-99 (Wis.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 925 (1991). These courts accept the view 
summarized by the Kansas court: "Termination of parental rights is nothing more than a 
determination of the legal status between the natural parent and the child." M.L.K., 768 
P.2d at 319. Contra Phillips v. Thornfelt, 1986 Ky. App. Lexis 1116 (Kentucky Ct. App. 
1986) (unpublished).17 
17The overwhelming majority of state courts addressing the issue has also held that 
due process permits adjudication of the custody of a child residing in the forum state 
even absent the nonresident parent's minimum contacts with the state. In re Marriage of 
Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443, 450-60 (Cal. App. 1981); People ex rel. State of 
Wyoming ex rel. Watson v. Stout, 969 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); Balestrieri 
v. Maliska, 622 So. 2d 561, 563 & n.l (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Thompson v. 
Thompson, 526 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); In re Marriage ofMobley, 569 N.E.2d 
323 (111. App. Ct. 1991); Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001); Martinez v. 
Reed, 490 So. 2d 303, 306 n.l (La. Ct. App. 1986); Glanzner v. State Dep 't of Social 
Servs., 835 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Genoe v. Genoe, 500 A.2d 3 (N.J. App. 
1985); Harris v. Harris, 410 S.E.2d 527 (N.C Ct. App. 1991); Miff v. Miff, 829 P.2d 
34, 36 n.5 (Okl. 1992); Pratt v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405,409 (R.I. 1981); Roderick v. 
Roderick, 116 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Term. Ct. App. 1989); In re S.A. V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 
84 (Tex. 1992); McAtee v. McAtee, 323 S.E.2d 611 (W. Va. 1984); Davidson v. 
Davidson, 485 N.W.2d 450, 556 (Wise. Ct. App. 1992). Contra In re John Doe, 926 
P.2d 1290, 1299 (Haw. 1996); In re Vernon R.V., 991 P.2d 986 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the status exception also should 
apply to adoptions. In In re Adoption of ILK, 131 P.2d 915 (Okla. 1987), the 
stepmother and father sought an adoption of the child without consent of the nonresident 
mother. A key issue was the court's personal jurisdiction over the mother because she 
lacked minimum contacts with the state. The court held that minimum contacts of the 
mother was not required because no personal judgment was sought against the mother. 
All that was sought was a status determination relating to the child, and it was a resident 
of Oklahoma. See also In re Baby Boy Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 435 S.E.2d 352 
(1993) (minimum contacts not required to terminate parental rights collateral to 
adoption). 
The status exception provides personal jurisdiction over a putative father in 
an adoption absent minimum contacts. Otherwise, a court could have jurisdiction over 
the adoption itself, and the adoptive family and child may even be residents of the state 
where the adoption is pending, yet a natural parent may be a resident of another state and 
may not have minimum contacts with the state where the adoption is pending. Children 
in such cases, like this one, are the ones who suffer. The status exception allows 
adoptions in cases like this one to be finalized so that the child will be able to have as 
normal a life as possible as soon as possible. 
See also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); In re Dean, 447 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1984); 
Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 406 N.E.2d 1121 (Ohio 1980) (these courts refused to give 
full faith and credit to custody orders from other states absent the other state's personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident parent). 
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V. IF THIS COURT SIDES WITH OSBORNE, INTERSTATE 
ADOPTIONS WILL CEASE AND THOUSANDS OF FINALIZED 
ADOPTIONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE. 
If the Court agrees with Osborne on his personal jurisdiction argument, 
interstate adoptions in Utah will cease and literally thousands of adoptions already 
finalized in Utah would be subject to challenge. A judgment entered without personal 
jurisdiction over the party to be bound is null and void. Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 
791, 795 (Utah 1988) (judgment "entered without valid in personam jurisdiction . . . is 
null and void"). Agreeing with Osborne would mean that adoptive families would never 
want to take a child into their home if any putative father of the child is a nonresident of 
Utah. Interstate adoptions would be brought to a standstill. Also, any already final 
adoption would be subject to challenge if the putative birth father is a nonresident and 
does not have minimum contacts with Utah. There likely are thousands of such 
adoptions on the books in Utah. 
Not only would this be a disaster-in-the-making, such a ruling would be 
contrary to clearly stated legislative policy, and the "strong state interest" recognized by 
this Court "in immediate and secure adoptions for eligible newborns." Wells v. 
Children s Aid Society, 681 P.2dl99, 203 (Utah 1984). The Legislature has stated that 
"the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for 
adoptive children in a prompt manner, [and] in preventing the disruption of adoptive 
placements." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(a) (emphasis added). "[A]n unmarried 
mother, faced with the responsibility of making crucial decisions about the future of a 
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newborn child,... has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her 
future and the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding the permanence 
of an adoptive placement." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(b). Ruling for Osborne 
would undermine these policies. 
The Legislature also concluded that "adoptive children have a right to 
permanence and stability in adoptive placements," and that "the interests of the state, 
the mother, the child, and the adoptive parents described in this section outweigh 
the interest of an unmarried biological father who does not timely grasp the 
opportunity to establish and demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance with 
the requirements of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.12(2)(c) and 
78-30-4.12(3)(c) (emphasis added). See also Wells, 681 P.2d at 203. ("The state has a 
strong interest in speedily identifying those persons who will assume the parental role 
over [illegitimate] children, not just to assure immediate and continued physical care but 
also to facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to its parents.") 
Yet, if the Court places greater weight on Osborne's personal jurisdiction 
argument—asserted by a person who is not the legal father of the child under North 
Carolina law and who did not establish his rights under Utah law—than it places on the 
right of the mother to place the child for adoption, on the state's compelling interest in 
stable and permanent placements, or on the right of the child to be in a secure and stable 
placement, these compelling interests will disappear for interstate adoptions. The Court 
should not bring a halt to interstate adoptions or jeopardize thousands of already 
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finalized adoptions by allowing nonresident putative fathers to challenge these adoptions 
on minimum contacts grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Writ of Certiorari 
as improvidently granted, should remand with instructions to dismiss the Mandamus 
Petition, or should affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. 
DATED this 22nd day of November, 2002. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
2t 
Larry S.vfenki: 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Adoption Center of Choice 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12. Rights and responsibilities of parties in adoption 
proceedings. 
(1) The Legislature finds that the rights and interests of all parties affected by an adoption 
proceeding must be considered and balanced in determining what constitutional protections and 
processes are necessary and appropriate. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for 
adoptive children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of adoptive 
placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of children; 
(b) an unmarried mother, faced with the responsibility of making crucial decisions about 
the future of a newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and has the right to make timely and 
appropriate decisions regarding her future and the future of the child, and is entitled to 
assurance regarding the permanence of an adoptive placement; 
(c) adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive placements; 
(d) adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interest in 
retaining custody of an adopted child; and 
(e) an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires constitutional 
protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth. The state 
has a compelling interest in requiring unmarried biological fathers to demonstrate that 
commitment by providing appropriate medical care and financial support and by 
establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. 
(3) (a) In enacting Sections 78-30-4.11 through 78-30-4.21, the Legislature prescribes the 
conditions for determining whether an unmarried biological father's action is sufficiently 
prompt and substantial to require constitutional protection. 
(b) If an unmarried biological father fails to grasp the opportunities to establish a 
relationship with his child that are available to him, his biological parental interest may 
be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in constitutional significance by his failure to 
timely exercise it, or by his failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps to 
substantiate it. 
(c) A certain degree of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the state's compelling 
interest. The Legislature finds that the interests of the state, the mother, the child, and the 
adoptive parents described in this section outweigh the interest of an unmarried biological 
father who does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and demonstrate a 
relationship with his child in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. 
(d) An unmarried biological father has the primary responsibility to protect his rights. 
(e) An unmarried biological father is presumed to know that the child may be adopted 
without his consent unless he strictly complies with the provisions of this chapter, 
manifests a prompt and full commitment to his parental responsibilities, and establishes 
paternity. 
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried mother has a right of privacy with regard to her 
pregnancy and adoption plan, and therefore has no legal obligation to disclose the identity of an 
unmarried biological father prior to or during an adoption proceeding, and has no obligation to 
volunteer information to the court with respect to the father. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13, Notice of adoption proceedings. 
(1) An unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that he has engaged in a sexual 
relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption 
proceeding regarding that child may occur, and has a duty to protect his own rights and interests. 
He is therefore entitled to actual notice of a birth or an adoption proceeding with regard to that 
child only as provided in this section. 
(2) Notice of an adoption proceeding shall be served on each of the following persons: 
(a) any person or agency whose consent or relinquishment is required under Section 78-
30-4.14 unless that right has been terminated by waiver, relinquishment, consent, or 
judicial action; 
(b) any person who has initiated a paternity proceeding and filed notice of that action 
with the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health, in accordance 
with Subsection (3); 
(c) any legally appointed custodian or guardian of the adoptee; 
(d) the petitioner's spouse, if any, only if he has not joined in the petition; 
(e) the adoptee's spouse, if any; 
(f) any person who is recorded on the birth certificate as the child's father, with the 
knowledge and consent of the mother; 
(g) any person who is openly living in the same household with the child at the time the 
consent is executed or relinquishment made, and who is holding himself out to be the 
child's father; and 
(h) any person who is married to the child's mother at the time she executes her consent to 
the adoption or relinquishes the child for adoption. 
(3) (a) In order to preserve any right to notice and consent, an unmarried biological father 
may initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act 
on Paternity, and file a notice of the initiation of those proceedings with the state registrar 
of vital statistics within the Department of Health prior to the mother's execution of 
consent or her relinquishment to an agency. That action and notice may also be filed prior 
to the child's birth. 
(b) If the unmarried biological father does not know the county in which the birth mother 
resides, he may initiate his action in any county, subject to a change in trial pursuant to 
Section 78-13-7. 
(c) The Department of Health shall provide forms for the purpose of filing the notice 
described in Subsection (3)(a), and make those forms available in the office of the county 
health department in each county. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14. Necessary consent to adoption or relinquishment for 
adoption. 
(1) Either relinquishment for adoption to a licensed child-placing agency or consent to adoption 
is required from: 
(a) the adoptee, if he is more than 12 years of age, unless he does not have the mental 
capacity to consent; 
(b) both parents or the surviving parent of an adoptee who was conceived or born within a 
marriage, unless the adoptee is 18 years of age or older; 
(c) the mother of an adoptee born outside of marriage; 
(d) any biological parent who has been adjudicated to be the child's biological father by a 
court of competent jurisdiction prior to the mother's execution of consent or her 
relinquishment to an agency for adoption; 
(e) any biological parent who has executed and filed a voluntary declaration of paternity 
with the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health in accordance 
with Title 78, Chapter 45e, prior to the mother's execution of consent or her 
relinquishment to an agency for adoption, which voluntary declaration of paternity is 
considered filed when entered into a database that can be accessed by the Department of Health; 
(f) an unmarried biological father of an adoptee, as defined in Section 78-30-4.11, only if 
the requirements and conditions of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) have been proven; and 
(g) the licensed child-placing agency to whom an adoptee has been relinquished and that 
is placing the child for adoption. 
(2) In accordance with Subsection (1), the consent of an unmarried biological father is necessary 
only if the father has strictly complied with the requirements of this section. 
* * * 
(b) With regard to a child who is under six months of age at the time he is placed with 
adoptive parents, an unmarried biological father shall have manifested a full commitment 
to his parental responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in this subsection 
prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to 
a licensed child-placing agency. The father shall: 
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform 
Act on Paternity, and file with that court a sworn affidavit stating that he is fully 
able and willing to have full custody of the child, setting forth his plans for care of 
the child, and agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of 
expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth; 
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with the state 
registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health, in a confidential 
registry established by the department for that purpose, which notice is considered 
filed when the notice is entered in the registry of notices from unmarried 
biological fathers; and 
(iii) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, paid a fair and reasonable 
amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and 
the child's birth, in accordance with his means, and when not prevented from 
doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. 
(3) An unmarried biological father whose consent is required under Subsection (1) or (2) may 
nevertheless lose his right to consent if the court determines, in accordance with the requirements 
and procedures of Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 4, Termination of Parental Rights Act, that his rights 
should be terminated, based on the petition of any interested party. 
(4) If there is no showing that an unmarried biological father has consented to or waived his 
rights regarding a proposed adoption, the petitioner shall file with the court a certificate from the 
state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health, stating that a diligent search has 
been made of the registry of notices from unmarried biological fathers described in Subsection 
(2)(b)(ii), and that no filing has been found pertaining to the father of the child in question, or if a 
filing is found, stating the name of the putative father and the time and date of filing. That 
certificate shall be filed with the court prior to entrance of a final decree of adoption. 
(5) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly comply with each of the 
conditions provided in this section, is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in 
relation to the child, including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with 
the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4,15. Responsibility of each party for their own actions -- Fraud or 
misrepresentation - Statutory compliance. 
(1) Each parent of a child conceived or born outside of marriage is responsible for his or her own 
actions and is not excused from strict compliance with the provisions of this chapter based upon 
any action, statement, or omission of the other parent or third parties. 
(2) Any person injured by fraudulent representations or actions in connection with an adoption is 
entitled to pursue civil or criminal penalties in accordance with existing law. A fraudulent 
representation is not a defense to strict compliance with the requirements of this chapter, and is 
not a basis for dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation of an adoption decree, or an 
automatic grant of custody to the offended party. Custody determinations shall be based on the 
best interest of the child, in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-30-4.16. 
(3) The Legislature finds no practical way to remove all risk of fraud or misrepresentation in 
adoption proceedings, and has provided a method for absolute protection of an unmarried 
biological father's rights by compliance with the provisions of this chapter. In balancing the 
rights and interests of the state, and of all parties affected by fraud, specifically the child, the 
adoptive parents, and the unmarried biological father, the Legislature has determined that the 
unmarried biological father is in the best position to prevent or ameliorate the effects of fraud and 
that, therefore, the burden of fraud shall be borne by him. 
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried biological father who resides in another state may 
not, in every circumstance, be reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly comply with, the 
requirements of this chapter. Therefore when all of the following requirements have been met, 
that unmarried biological father may contest an adoption, prior to finalization of the decree of 
adoption, and assert his interest in the child; the court may then, in its discretion, proceed with an 
evidentiary hearing under Subsection 78-30-4.16(2): 
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has resided in another state where the 
unmarried mother was also located or resided; 
(b) the mother left that state without notifying or informing the unmarried biological 
father that she could be located in the state of Utah; 
(c) the unmarried biological father has, through every reasonable means, attempted to 
locate the mother but does not know or have reason to know that the mother is residing in 
the state of Utah; and 
(d) the unmarried biological father has complied with the most stringent and complete 
requirements of the state where the mother previously resided or was located, in order to 
protect and preserve his parental interest and right in the child in cases of adoption. 
North Carolina Adoption Provisions 
North Carolina Code §§ 48-2-100, Jurisdiction. 
(a)Adoption shall be by a special proceeding before the clerk of superior court. 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, jurisdiction over adoption proceedings 
commenced under this Chapter exists if, at the commencement of the proceeding: 
(1) The adoptee has lived in this State for at least the six consecutive months immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition or from birth, and the prospective adoptive parent is 
domiciled in this State; or 
(2) The prospective adoptive parent has lived in or been domiciled in this State for at least 
the six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition. 
(c) The courts of this State shall not exercise jurisdiction under this Chapter if at the time the 
petition for adoption is filed, a court of any other state is exercising jurisdiction substantially in 
conformity with the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Article 2 of 
Chapter 50A of the General Statutes. 
North Carolina Code §§ 48-3-603. Persons whose consent is not required. 
(a)Consent to an adoption of a minor is not required of a person or entity whose consent is not 
required under G.S. 48-3-601, or: 
(1) An individual whose parental rights and duties have been terminated under Article 11 
of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes or by a court of competent jurisdiction in another 
state;. . . 
North Carolina Legitimation Provisions 
North Carolina Code §§ 49-12.1. Legitimation when mother married. 
(a)The putative father of a child born to a mother who is married to another man may file a 
special proceeding to legitimate the child. The procedures shall be the same as those specified by 
G.S. 49-10, except that the spouse of the mother of the child shall be a necessary party to the 
proceeding and shall be properly served. A guardian ad litem shall be appointed to represent the 
child if the child is a minor. 
(b) The presumption of legitimacy can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 
(c) The parties may enter a consent order with the approval of the clerk of superior court. The 
order entered by the clerk shall find the facts and declare the proper person the father of the child 
and may change the surname of the child. 
(d) The effect of legitimation under this section shall be the same as provided by G.S. 49-11. 
(e) A certified copy of the order of legitimation under this section shall be sent by the clerk of 
superior court under his official seal to the State Registrar of Vital Statistics who shall make a 
new birth certificate bearing the full name of the father of the child and, if ordered by the clerk, 
changing the surname of the child. 
North Carolina Code §§ 49-10. Legitimation. 
The putative father of any child born out of wedlock, whether such father resides in North 
Carolina or not, may apply by a verified written petition, filed in a special proceeding in the 
superior court of the county in which the putative father resides or in the superior court of the 
county in which the child resides, praying that such child be declared legitimate. The mother, if 
living, and the child shall be necessary parties to the proceeding, and the full names of the father, 
mother and the child shall be set out in the petition. A certified copy of a certificate of birth of 
the child shall be attached to the petition. If it appears to the court that the petitioner is the father 
of the child, the court may thereupon declare and pronounce the child legitimated; and the full 
names of the father, mother and the child shall be set out in the court order decreeing legitimation 
of the child. The clerk of the court shall record the order in the record of orders and decrees and it 
shall be cross- indexed under the name of the father as plaintiff or petitioner on the plaintiffs side 
of the cross-index, and under the name of the mother, and the child as defendants or respondents 
on the defendants' side of the cross-index. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, HI, 
A Minor Child. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
026^-Case No. 0204 
Date: March 18,2002 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is a Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. 
("Adoption Center"). The Court, having heard oral argument, and reviewed and considered all 
relevant memoranda, including the supplemental memoranda filed while this Motion was under 
advisement, now grants Adoption Center's Motion. 
FACTS 
1. Adoption Center is an adoption agency licensed by the State of Utah. 
2. On or about January 4, 2002, Angela Baker relinquished her son, Kenneth Skyler Baker, 
to Adoption Center to be placed for adoption in Utah. 
3. Kenneth was bom in Utah on August 6, 2001. His birth certificate lists no father, only 
Angela as the birth mother. 
4. On January 15, 2002, Angela Baker's husband, Donny Baker, who is not the birth father 
but is the legal father, gave written consent to Kenneth's placement for adoption. 
5. Frank Osborne, a resident of the State of North Carolina and petitioner in this action, 
claims to be Kenneth's birth father. Osborne commenced a paternity and custody action in North 
Carolina on February 11, 2002. 
6. Kenneth was placed with a family for adoption sometime previous to February 11, 2002. 
7. On February 14, 2002, Osborne filed a verified petition challenging subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court in this matter, along with an ex parte motion to open the adoption file, 
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and a motion for order to show cause. 
8. This Court granted the ex parte motion in part on February 15, 2002. The Court ordered 
the adoption file opened, but only if the file could be identified through a search of Court records. 
Osborne has apparently been unable to identify the adoption file. 
9. The Court declined to grant Osborne an order requiring Adoption Center to disclose the 
identities of the adoptive parents and denied Osborne's motion to reconsider the ex parte order of 
February 15. 
10. On February 21, 2002, Osborne served Adoption Center with a subpoena seeking 
disclosure of the identities of the adoptive parents, the attorneys involved in the filing of the 
adoption petition, the county in which the petition was filed, the names of any judges who have 
issued rulings or orders in the case, and the case number of the file. 
11. On February 26, 2002, Adoption Center responded with this Motion to Quash Subpoena. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
Adoption Center argues that it should be protected from subpoena for the following 
reasons. First, the identities of the adoptive parents of Kenneth are protected and confidential 
under the regulations governing state licensed child-placement agencies. Second, assuming Frank 
Osborne is Kenneth's biological father, he has completely waived any right that he might have 
with respect to Kenneth under the Utah code. Third, Adoption Center asserts that because the 
adoption of Kenneth is not final, Adoption Center still has legal custody and control of Kenneth, 
and Osborne does not need the identities of the adoptive parents to protect his interests. 
The Court concludes that Adoption Center's analysis of the applicable law is accurate. 
Child placing agencies are required to treat all adoption records as confidential, and "[n]o 
information [should] be shared with any person without the appropriate consent forms." Utah 
Admin, Code § R501-7-4(A)(15) (2002). Because these records are confidential and protected by 
law, the Court must quash or modify any subpoena requiring disclosure when no exception or 
waiver applies. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2001). The court concludes that Osborne has 
not articulated any waiver or exception that should apply in this case. 
1.4F. 
Further, Frank Osborne has not complied with the legal requirements for preserving his 
parental rights under Utah law. The legislature has established the standard that must be met by 
an unmarried biological father to preserve his rights, stating very clearly that "[he] is presumed to 
know that the child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with the 
provisions of [Utah Code Title 78, Chapter 30], manifests a prompt and full commitment to his 
parental responsibilities, and establishes paternity." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(e) (2001). 
If the unmarried biological father does not strictly comply with the statutory requirements, he uis 
deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child . . . and his consent to 
the adoption of the child is not required." § 78-30-4.14(5). When a child is under six months old 
and placed for adoption, as Kenneth was, the biological father must (1) initiate paternity 
proceedings in accordance with the Code, (2) file notice of the paternity proceedings with the 
state registrar of vital statistics, and (3) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, pay a fair 
and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred during the pregnancy and birth. § 78-30-
4.14(2)(b). All of the requirements must be met "prior to the time the mother executes her 
consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted these statutory requirements in In re Adoption of 
B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). The facts of In re B.B.D. are strikingly similar to the current 
case, and this Court finds that the principles of that case apply squarely here as well. The father in 
that case "failed to take any action to establish paternity according to [Utah's] statutory scheme," 
id. at 971, and so waived and surrendered any right he had to his child. Similarly, Frank Osborne 
did not comply with the first two requirements of filing for paternity and filing proper notice of 
the action with the state of Utah. Angela Baker relinquished her child to Adoption Center on or 
about January 4, and Osborne did not file a paternity action until February 11 in North Carolina. 
He has still not filed an action in Utah, aside from his petition challenging the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Osborne has failed to take any action according to the statutory requirements, and so has 
waived any right to Kenneth he may have otherwise had. Having so waived those rights, the 
Court concludes that the information Osborne seeks by the subpoena is of no worth to Mr. 
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Osborne. 
Adoption Center makes the additional point that it stands as the legal custodian of 
Kenneth from the date his mother relinquished him until the time the adoption is finalized. This 
assertion is conrect according to Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.22, which states that the child-
placing agency has "custody and control" during that period of time. Osborne can assert his 
interests directly against Adoption Center and has no need to discover the identities of Kenneth's 
adoptive parents. 
In oral argument before the court, Osborne attempted to show that the Utah Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101 to 
318, applied to deny the Court jurisdiction over the matter before it. In making that argument, 
Osborne seemed to be attempting to bifurcate the definition of an "adoption proceeding" into two 
separate actions, one a child custody action and the other an action to terminate the parental 
rights of the natural parents. However, to make the argument that the UCCJEA applies to the 
current proceedings with regard to Kenneth's adoption, Osborne must somehow circumvent § 78-
45c-103, which clearly states: "This chapter [the UCCJEA] does not govern: (1) an adoption 
proceeding . . . " The Court does not agree with Osborne that these proceedings regarding 
Kenneth's adoption should properly be construed as anything but an "adoption proceeding" in the 
plain language of the statute. The UCCJEA does not apply here, as evidenced by its plain 
language. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Court concludes that the subpoena of Adoption Center should be 
quashed. Adoption Center has a legal duty to keep the contents of the adoption file, including the 
names of the adoptive parents, confidential. Because the adoption file is legally protected, the 
Court is required to quash or modify any subpoena of its contents absent any exception or waiver. 
Osborne, having not strictly complied with the Utah adoption statutes, has not preserved any of 
his rights with respect to Kenneth under Utah law, and cannot show good cause why the file 
should be opened when he is free to proceed directly against Adoption Center. Therefore, 
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Adoption Center's Motion to Quash Subpoena is granted for the reasons stated above. 
Adoption Center's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it 
for the Court's signature. 
DATED this day of _ fat6(A.
 f, 2002, 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 020400623 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
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PROVO DEPARTMENT 
2202 MAR 15 A 10 51 ^ ~ 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
Our File No. 26,372 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, III, 
A Minor Child. 
REPLY RE: SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM ON AGENCY'S 
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA 
Case No.020400623 
Judge Hansen 
The petitioner Frank Osborne here replies to the Adoption Center of Choice's1 
response to the supplemental memorandum that Mr. Osborne previously filed in this matter. That 
memorandum pointed out to the Court the recent decision of In Re W. A.. 2002 Utah App. 72 
(March 7, 2002), and its relevance to the Court's decision as to whether Mr. Osborne is entitled to 
identifying information to enable him to serve the adoptive parents with the petition he has filed in 
this matter. 
It is curious that the defendants would argue that In Re W. A does not apply in this case. The 
agency appears to argue that In Re W. A only applies in proceedings initially commenced as 
termination of parental rights proceedings. The agency ignores that adoption proceedings by their 
very nature contemplate both termination and custody adjudications. 
1
 Throughout this memorandum Mr. Osborne refers to the Adoption Center of Choice as 
the "agency." 
Adoption is the legal process by which a child acquires parents other 
than his natural parents and parents acquire a child under the natural 
child. As a result of the adoption decree legal rights and obligations 
which formerly existed between the child and his natural parents 
come to an end, and are replaced by similar rights and obligations 
with respect to his new adoptive parents. It is common, in 
considering adoption, to focus attention on the second of the steps, 
that is, the formation of the legal bond with the adoptive parents, but 
since in our legal system it is generally the case that the parent-
child relationship may exist with only one set of parents at a timef 
adoption also necessarily involves the termination of the bond with 
the natural parents. In some jurisdictions the two steps are 
accomplished by two separate lawsuits, the first being referred to as 
a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the second as 
adoption. Both steps will be considered in this chapter under the 
general heading of adoption. 
Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 20.1 at 850 (1988) 
(emphasis supplied). 
It appears everyone, including the commentators, accept this fundamental maxim - everyone, 
that is, except for the agency. But even more important than the commentators are the cases. For 
example, in In Re W. A, the court spoke with disapproval of In re Appeal In Maricopa County. 543 
P.2d 454 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975), a termination of parental rights proceeding. That case, in turn, cites 
the seminal case of In Re Soderberg. 226 P. 210 (Ariz. 1924), an adoption case famous for refusing 
to require personal jurisdiction over a putative natural father. See, e.g.. Clark at § 20.3 at 875 n. 49. 
(Copies of the quoted portions of the Clark treatise are attached hereto for the Court's convenience, 
as are the non-Utah cases.) This free interchange between adoption and termination of parental 
rights cases is but one example of the fact that the principles and concepts discussed in both types 
of cases are exactly the same. The termination cases rejecting "status" jurisdiction from Kentucky, 
New Mexico, Florida and Delaware (all cited in In Re W. A. at f 24) are accompanied by adoption 
cases reaching the same conclusion in Illinois, Donlon v. Miller. 355 N.E.2d 195 (111. App. 1976), 
2 
and New Jersey, Matter of Adoption of Child by McKinlev, 384 A.2d 920 (N.J. Super. 1978).2 
Petitioner's counsel alluded to the fungibility of termination law, whether arising in 
affirmative termination cases or in adoption cases, in oral argument on the motion to quash, pointing 
out that even though the UCCJEA purports to exclude a adoption proceedings, it specifically 
includes proceedings governing termination of parental rights. Thus, in this case where the 
fundamental question is the propriety of Utah courts exercising jurisdiction of the subject matter over 
Mr. Osborne, and the termination of his parental rights, the UCCJEA does indeed apply. Moreover, 
and perhaps more to the point raised in the agency's response. In Re W. A. clearly does apply in any 
termination proceedings, whether those arise out of adoption or are initiated independently under 
another provision of the Utah code. One should remember that the concern raised by the court in 
In Re W. A. was not whether statutory procedures had been followed or were sufficient, but rather 
whether the constitutional rights of the father had been properly protected. In Re W. A., 2002 Utah 
App. 72 f 7 n. 3 ("[A] violation of long held constitutional protections is not permissible simply 
because other procedural safeguards are satisfied."). 
Perhaps most disturbing in the agency's response is the absurd contention that Mr. Osborne 
may not raise any arguments governing this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him when 
he has limited his initial petition to a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. In the colloquy during 
oral argument on the motion to quash, Mr. Osborne's counsel felt it would be helpful, even 
necessary, to point out to the Court where this dispute could lead. One must recall that the dispute 
before the Court is whether to reveal information, and central to the Court's decision with respect 
2These cases clearly rule that the fact that in adoption cases the father's parental status 
might be inchoate or otherwise unclear does not affect whether a forum has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate that status. That's the key, and it's the premise the agency consistently and 
deliberately overlooks in its arguments. 
3 
1 Qfi 
to that decision is the proceeding to which that information will be subject and in which it may be 
relevant. If this Court rejects Mr. Osborne's subject matter jurisdiction argument, he fully intends 
to challenge this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. The Court should bear this in 
mind as it assesses the need to reveal the information requested.3 
Throughout its response the agency consistently and somewhat casually assumes that various 
provisions of Utah law magically apply to Mr. Osborne. Mr. Osborne is not interested in and is not 
affected by title 78 chapter 3a of the Utah code. Mr. Osborne is not interested in and is not affected 
by title 62 A chapter 4a of the Utah code. Mr. Osborne is not interested in and is not affected by title 
78 chapter 30 of the Utah code. In short, Mr. Osborne is not interested in and is not affected by any 
provision of Utah law, except those limited provisions under rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the UCCJEA that allow him to challenge any exercise whatsoever of the Utah courts 
over his rights. This is true notwithstanding the agency's "legal prestidigitation," In Re W. A.. 2002 
Utah App. 72 at f 23 n. 14. to show otherwise. 
As a final note, Mr. Osborne is well aware of the constitutional requirements and 
responsibilities imposed upon all the actors in this proceeding: him, the adoptive parents, the agency, 
and the natural mother. It may well be that an inquiry into whether he has satisfied his constitutional 
responsibilities may be warranted. But, as clarified by In Re W. A., Utah is not the place where that 
inquiry should occur. 
3The agency mentions in its memorandum its request that Mr. Osborne's petition be 
dismissed. This request has never been reduced to motion, and is not properly before the Court. 
In the event it is brought before the Court, it should be properly briefed and be subject to oral 
argument, inasmuch as it is a dispositive motion. Mr. Osborne would note that should the Court 
be inclined to dismiss the petition, he be granted leave to amend with his personal jurisdiction 
challenges mentioned above. 
4 
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inquiry should occur. 
Accordingly, the Court should deny the motion to quash and allow service of his petition 
upon the adoptive parents. This is after all a modest request and ultimately protects the adoptive 
parents' interests.4 
DATED this 15th day of March, 2002. 
?, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this l£ day of March, 2002. 
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq. 
Wood & Crapo 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 




 As noted in oral argument, the agency is not qualified to protect the adoptive parents' 
interests in this matter. There is an inherent conflict of interest between the agency and the 
parents, since if the adoption goes awry the parents may have a claim against the agency. The 
parents' interests are therefore not well served within the current posture. 
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The Court has before it, and under advisement, the Adoption Center of Choice's Motion to 
Quash Subpoena, a subpoena issued by petitioner which seeks information regarding Kenneth Skyler 
Baker III. Particularly, petitioner requests the identity of the adoptive parents so they may be served, 
along with information in the adoption file so as to perfect his jurisdictional challenge thereto. 
The Court may recall that in oral argument and in his petition the petitioner restricted his 
argument to a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, but that should subject matter jurisdiction be 
found, petitioner would bring due process challenges to the application of Utah law to him in this 
matter. 
The Utah Court of Appeals decided yesterday the case of In re W.A., 2002 UT App. 72 
(March 7,2002), wherein the court reversed a lower court ruling that Utah state courts could exercise 
jurisdiction over a nonresident father to terminate his parental rights. Adoption has a tennination 
component directly affecting petitioner (whose rights have purportedly been terminated by a Utah 
County), and so the case applies here. 
The W.A. court ruled as follows: 
1. Father had established minimum contacts with Utah because he allowed child to be 
cared for by Utah state agencies. This constituted purposeful availment. [Here, there 
is arguably no purposeful availment, since Kenneth was kidnaped by his mother and 
transported to Utah]. 
2. The Utah long-arm statute failed to apply, however, because father had never been 
in Utah, conducted business in Utah, committed a tortuous injury in Utah, or owned 
or used real property in Utah. [Here, these same facts obtain]. 
3. Alternatively. Utah could not assert jurisdiction over father under the so-called 
"status" exception that has perpetuated itself in U.S. Supreme Court rulings since 
Pennover v. Neff, most recently articulated in footnote 30 in Shaffer v. Heitnen 433 
U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977). That case indicates that states may adjudicate the status 
of certain relationships between parties. While some states have deemed the 
relationship between parent and child as a relationship governed by "status" 
jurisdiction, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected this notion, citing the fundamental 
liberty interest at stake in parenthood. The court then concluded that without 
personal jurisdiction, the predicate findings required to terminate parental rights 
could not be made. [Here, the Court would be required to make certain findings as 
to the father's conduct so as to terminate his rights incident to the adoption, and, 




Under In re W.A., it appears that status jurisdiction in termination of parental rights cases, 
and adoption cases a fortiori, is dead. This is a watershed case in the world of interstate custody, 
adoption and termination cases, and places major constraints on extraterritorial application of Utah's 
adoption code. It may very well eliminate the long-standing and reprehensible practice of Utah being 
a clearinghouse for natural mothers and adoptive parents who take refuge in Utah in order to divest 
foreign fathers of their parental rights. In any event, petitioner contends that it clearly and 
convincingly demonstrates his likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and justifies giving him the 
information he now seeks. 
The court should allow the subpoena to go forward and require the Adoption Center to reveal 
to his counsel the identity of the adoptive parents and the contents of the adoption file of child Baker. 
DATED this 8th day of March, 2002. 
P f f l L L I ^ t O W R Y , ^ 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
3 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this ^ day of March, 2002. 
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq. 
Wood & Crapo 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84603 
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necessary for him to attempt to establish his rights regarding the child. Indeed, he has not even 
established that he is the father. 
II. MR. OSBORNE HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHTS TO THE CHILD. 
Assuming Mr. Osborne is a putative father of the child, which has not been 
established, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14, an unmarried biological father, such as Mr. 
Osborne, is "deemed" to have "waived and surrendered any right in relation to [his] child" if he 
does not "fully and strictly comply" with several statutory conditions to establishing and 
protecting his parental rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5) (emphasis added). These 
conditions are: the unmarried biological father must (1) "initiate proceedings to establish 
paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity"; (2) "file with th[e] court a 
sworn affidavit stating that he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the child"; (3) 
"set[] forth his plans for care of the child"; (4) "agreef] to a court order of child support and the 
payment of expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth"; 
(5) "file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with the state registrar of vital 
statistics within the Department of Health"; and (6) "if he had actual knowledge of the 
pregnancy, pa[yj a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the 
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b).3 
Importantly, all of these conditions must be performed by the unmarried birth 
father "prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to 
3
 These six conditions apply to an unmarried biological father's rights to a child 
who has been placed for adoption within six months of the child's birth. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.14(2)(b). The child that is the subject of this case was placed for adoption about five 
months after his birth. 
4 
a licensed chid-placing agency." Id at § 78-30-4.14(b) (emphasis added). If he does not "fully 
and strictly comply with each of the[se] conditions" he "is deemed to have waived and 
surrendered any right in relation to the child, including the right to notice of any judicial 
proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the 
child is not required." Id. § 78-30-4.14(b)(5) (emphasis added). 
The legal effect of an unwed birth father's failure to comply with these provisions 
was recently examined and upheld by the Utah Supreme Court in In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 984 
P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). The birth father in In re B.B.D. was a resident of Washington who had 
impregnated his girlfriend after they began dating. Unlike this case, there was no doubt he was 
the father. Shortly after finding out about her pregnancy, the birth mother discussed with the 
birth father the options regarding their unborn child's future. One option included placing the 
child for adoption with the birth mother's brother and sister-in-law, who resided in American 
Fork, Utah. The birth father was opposed to this option at the outset of their discussions. Id. 
at 969. 
The birth mother and birth father ended their relationship several months before 
the birth of the child. At about the same time of their break-up, the birth mother informed the 
birth father that she had spoken with lawyers in Washington and Utah regarding the placement of 
her child for adoption. The birth father again expressed his opposition to that proposal. Shortly 
before the birth of the child, the birth mother informed the birth father that she was flying to Utah 
to stay with her brother and sister-in-law, to give birth, and to place the child with them for 
adoption. The birth father continued to express his opposition to the proposed adoption. Id 
at 969. 
5 
In opposing the adoption, the birth father went to the Division of Social and 
Health Services in Washington in an attempt to establish paternity by registration. He was 
informed, however, that he could not establish paternity until after the child's birth. On 
October 25, 1996, the child was born in American Fork, Utah. Id at 969-70. 
On October 28, 1996, the birth mother signed her consent to the adoption, 
relinquished her parental rights, and placed the child with the adoptive parents. On that same 
day, the adoptive parents filed their petition to adopt. The birth father learned about the adoption 
proceedings on November 6, 1996, and on November 11,1996, he went to the Domestic 
Relations Division in Washington to fill out a paternity questionnaire. Shortly thereafter, the 
birth father received notice from the Division that it lacked jurisdiction over the child because the 
child was born in Utah. The birth father did not file a paternity action in either Washington or 
Utah. Id at 969-70. 
On November 26, 1996, the birth father filed a letter of opposition to the adoption 
proceeding with the district court and on December 20, 1996, he filed an "Answer and 
Counterclaim" for custody of the child. The adoptive parents filed a motion to dismiss the 
Answer and Counterclaim, which was treated as a motion for summary judgment. The adoptive 
parents' motion was granted by the district court because the birth father had failed to follow 
Utah's statutory scheme for establishing paternity and, as such, he had no legal standing to 
contest the child's adoption. See id. at 970. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling, and 
the case was granted certiorari review by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Before the Supreme Court, the birth father argued that his parental rights were 
protected by the constitution and could not be terminated without a showing of unfitness 
6 
pursuant to the termination code. The Supreme Court stated that "[w]hile it is true that the 
relationship between parent and child is afforded some protection by the federal and state 
constitutions,... the rights of parents are commensurate with the responsibilities they have 
assumed, and in the case of unmarried fathers, a biological relationship alone is insufficient to 
establish constitutionally protected parental rights." In re B.B.D., 984 P.2d at 970. The court 
continued: 
Under Utah law, "an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that 
acquires constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and 
upon the child's birth" An unmarried father demonstrates his commitment to 
the responsibilities of parenthood "by providing appropriate medical care and 
financial support, and by establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the 
requirements of [Utah law]." If an unmarried father fails to adhere to these 
requirements, including taking the necessary steps to establish paternity, "his 
biological parental interest may be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in 
constitutional significance by his failure to timely exercise it, or by his failure to 
strictly comply with the available legal steps to substantiate it." 
Id. at 970 (emphasis added; citations omitted; alteration in quoted opinion). 
The Supreme Court carefully distinguished between the rights of the birth mother 
and the rights of the unmarried birth father with regard to terminating the birth father's rights and 
the placing of a child for adoption. It stated: 
The unmarried mother, because she is "faced with the responsibility of making 
crucial decisions about the future of a newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and 
has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her future and 
the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding the permanence of an 
adoptive placement." [Utah Code Ann.] § 78-30-4.12(2)(b). An unmarried father, 
on the other hand, "by virtue of the fact that he has engaged in a sexual 
relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an 
adoption proceeding regarding that child may occur." [Utah Code Ann.] 
§ 78-30-4.13(1). Because he is deemed to be on notice, it becomes his 
responsibility to protect his own rights . . . according to the requirements of 
section 78-30-4.13 to 4.15 . . . . If an unmarried father fails to "fully and strictly 
7 
comply" with the [requirements of section 78-30-4.13 to -4.15], he "is deemed to 
have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child." 
M a t 971. 
In applying these principles to the facts in B.B.D., the Supreme Court found that 
the birth father, while from Washington, had done none of the things required under Utah law to 
establish his parental rights to the child. The father knew his girlfriend was pregnant, knew that 
she had gone to Utah to have the baby, and knew that she was considering placing the baby for 
adoption. Id. at 971. Despite this, the birth father "failed to take any action to establish paternity 
according to [Utah's] statutory scheme." Id. As a result, the birth father waived and surrendered 
any right he had to his child. Id. It did not matter that the birth father was a non-resident of 
Utah, since the birth father had subjected himself to the jurisdiction of Utah's courts by seeking 
custody and visitation of the child. Id at 973-74. 
In this case, Mr. Osborne has done nothing required by Utah law to establish his 
parental rights. The child was born in Utah and has a Utah birth certificate. See Exhibit C. Mr. 
Osborne surely knew this if he claims to be the father. Like the birth father in the B.B.D. 
decision, Mr. Osborne failed to take timely, let alone any, action to establish paternity according 
to Utah's statutory scheme. Neither the Court nor Adoption Center even knows whether he is the 
actual father of the child. As such, he is deemed to have waived all rights with respect to the 
child. Having waived all such rights, the information sought by the subpoena is of no worth to 
Mr. Osborne and the subpoena should be quashed pursuant to Rule 45(c)(3) as creating an undue 
burden on both the Adoption Center and the adoptive parents. 
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C enter*f Choice 
RELINQUISHMENT 
I, Angela Wilkinson Baker, being first duly sworn on oath depose and say: 
I am the parent of a baby boy, namely Kenneth Skyler Baker HI, born on the 06dl day of August, 2001 at 
Timpanogas Regional Hospital in the city of Orem, state of Utah. 
I am not an enrolled member of a Native American tribe or of an Alaskan Village tribe and, to the best of 
my knowledge; I ami not eligible for membership in a Native American tribe or an Alaskan Village tribe. 
I am not and was not married at the time of conception to the birth father, 
I do hereby relinquish and surrender said child for adoption to: 
The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. 
241 West 520 North Orem, UT 84057 
an organization licensed by the Department of Social Services, State of Utah, to find homes for children 
and to place children in homes for adoption. It is fully understood by me that when this relinquishment is 
signed, all my rights; to the custody, services and earnings for said minor child and any responsibility for 
the care and support of said minor child wiJI be terminated. 
Angela Wi^inson Baker Date 
gency Representative Time ' 
Notary 
State of 
County of J J ^ 
On this <^$\ day otC^g/J/j^ , 200k fl/l/Wfl ^fid^L* , personally 
appeared before me (^YJJ^$}AJI {A^^J^AJf^—~ u , a sworn Notary Public in and 
for said county and stat£/who is personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactoiy evidence) to 
be the same person whose name is subscribed to this instrument and signed the foregoing document in my presence 
and who swore or affirmed to me that their signature was voluntary and the document truthful. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed by official seal the day and year in which diis 
certificate was first above written. 
JUUENEANOER81N 
Notary fMMo 
Stale of Utah 
*fcn Expire** Mar. 30,3006 
Tel 801 11 
Fax 801 224-1899 
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Statement of Understanding 
I Fully understand that: 
1. As the birth parent, I have the primary right to parent this child, even if 1 am a minor. 
> 
2. There may be services and sources of financial assistance in the community which could 
be made available to me should I choose to parent this child. 
3. I have the right to know that the agency has the sole discretion to determine the 
placement of this child but nothing in this statement shall deny a birth parent(s) request 
for an identified placement. 
4. Legislation has made it possible for children relinquished for adoption to obtain 
knowledge regarding their birth parents. : 
5. I am aware of the Utah Voluntary Consent Registry coordinated through the Utah 
Department of Vital Statistics that allows me to register my wish to be placed in contact 
with my child once he/she is of age if he/she also chooses to register. 
6. 1 hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which may be held in courts of the 
State of Utah, or elsewhere, in connection with the adoption of this child. 
7. My decision to relinquish this child for adoption has been made voluntarily and of my 
own free will, without any coercion, force or duress from anyone including 
representatives of The Adoption Center oif Choice, Inc. 1 have received or been offered 
a copy of this document. 
8. I am not under the influence of any drugs, alcohol or medication that might affect my 
reasoning or judgment. 
9. 1 understand that if 1 choose adoption for my child and sign the relinquishing papers, all 
ray rights and responsibilities for this child will be ended, and that my consent is final 
and legally binding. 
J have read and understood this statement of understanding. 
ild(l. hntc/2. 7-V-64 
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Utah Birth C e r t i f i c a t i o n 
Kenneth Skyler Baker III 
Name of Child 
M a l e 
Sex o f C h i l d 
A u g u s t 6 , 2 0 0 1 
Data o f S i x t h 
2 1 : 4 8 
Time o f B i r t h 
06 Lbs 0 3 o z 
B i r t h Weight 
T i m p a n o g o s R e g i o n a l H o s p i t a l 
Place of Birth 
Orexa 
C i t y o f B i r t h 
Utah 
County of Birth 
James Br i n ton , M.D. 
Birth Attendant 
A n g e l a C a t h e r i n e W i l k i n s o n 
* Mbther Vs Maiden Name 
Is 
Becember 27, 1974 
Mother's Date of Birth 
Charlotte 
Mother's Residence City 
N o r t h C a r o l i n a >• */f x>^ 
Mother's Residence S t a t e / ^ a h t ^ # " 
,^ r -
A u g u s t 1 3 , 2 0 0 1 
Date o£ Reg is trat ion 
2 0 0 1 2 9 4 0 1 
F i l e Number SSA Card I ^ q ^ s t e d 
December 2 8 , 2 0 0 1 
Date Issued 
^ ? Vrritoje to certify that 
Uttxwjty'of 
If" " ' *J&J&'\ 
lp this office. Thie certified copy is issued 
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On this 7 ^ day <£U/L{/^MJ 20 /? L 
The Adoption CenterM Choice, fflc. 
hereby signifies its willingness to accept the annexedfrelinquishment 
and to accept said child for adoption. 
By. 
Agency Officj 
The undersigned, Donny Baker after being duly placed under oath represents that 
he is married to, Angela Wilkinson Baker. Angela delivered a baby boy, Kenneth 
Skyler Baker HI, on the 06th day of August, 2001. I fully understand that I am giving 
up any parental rights I may have for said child, as well as any obligations I may have due 
and owing to said minor child 
L I irrevocably consent to the adoption and submit to the jurisdiction of the 
Courts of the State of Utah and acknowledge and agree that all matters relating to 
the adoption of the child, including, but not limited to, the revocability or 
irrevocability of the consent to the adoption, shall be determined in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. 
2. I further represent that this consent to adoption proceedings is given of my 
own free will, without duress, and with full knowledge of the consequences of 
giving the same and that prior to executing this consent for adoption, I have had 
an opportunity to read said consent, and fully understand the terms hereof I 
further represent that I am not under the influence of any medication or drugs 
, which would impair my ability to reason and make decisions. 
3.1 understand and acknowledge that the laws for the State of Utah will prevail in 
all regards for this adoption, and specifically for the taking of this consent. 
4. I am not an enrolled member of an Indian tribe or of an Alaskan Village and, to 
the best of my knowledge, I am not eligible for membership in an Indian tribe or 
an Alaskan Village. 
5. I was married to the birth mother at the time of conception. I understand that it 
is necessary under Utah Statute for me to consent to these adoption proceedings. 
Tel 801 224-2440 
Fax 801224*1899 
6, I believe the adoption of the child would be in the best interests of the 
child. I have had enough time to carefully consider whether or not adoption is 
in my best interest and the best interest of the child. I have given careful thought 
to my decision to proceed with the adoption. 
7. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS CONSENT TO ADOPTION IS FINAL 
AND LEGALLY BINDING. AND MAY NOT BE REVOKED BY ME. 






lo y Baker 
I do hereby certify that the foregoing Consent to Adoption was signed in my 
presence by Donny Baker on V ^ ^ . ^ fg 20Q!^ 4nd that prior to signing said 
consent, the said parent of the *&ove nam#l minor children appeared before me; that he 
was by me duly sworn on oath; that he was then and there examined by me; that he freely 
signed the same and said document is a true and accurate reflection of his testimony. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this y ^ d a y of 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
NOTARY P U B L I C 
STATE OF UTAH 
My Commission Expires 
Nqvwi&flM 1,2004 
SANDRA W.bAVIS 
241 West 520 North 
Oram, Utah 84057 
I certify that this is a true copy of an original 
document sent to the aeeocy with a raised seal 
5-34)-©V 
Sandra W. Davis, Notary Public Date 
GQ 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
_ _ CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH 
FOR NOTICE OF THE INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY 
Name of Mother 
Angela Wilkinson (Baker) 
(Place of Chikfs Birth 
fOrem UT 
Date of Child's Birth or Estimated Birth Date 
August 6, 20CJ1 
Sex of Child 
Male 
This is to certify that a search has been made of the file of Notices of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity 
and/or the father's name is reported on the birth certificate with the Office of Vftal Records and Statistics, and no record 
was found to be on file. 
If a Notice of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity is found on file or the father's name is reported on the 
birth certificate, a certified copy will be issued. If no record is on file, a CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH is issued. 
January 7, 2002 
Date ~ 
UDH-0VRS-23 Revised 01/01 
10:52 AM 




FEB 2b P 5 52 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120'East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Our File No. 26,372 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, III, 




THE STATE OF UTAH SENDS GREETINGS TO: 
James Webb 
Registered Agent 
The Adoption Center of Choice 
241 West 520 North 
Orem, UT 84057 
WE COMMAND YOU, that all and singular business and excuses being laid aside, you 
appear and attend a deposition before a Certified Shorthand Reporter at the offices of Howard, 
Lewis & Petersen, on Friday, the 1st day of March, 2002, at 10:00 a.m., then and there to 
testify, at the taking of your deposition, in the above-entitled action now pending in said District 
Court on the part of respondents and disobedience will be punished as a contempt by said Court. 
r- r\ 
Said deposition will concern an adoption petition that concerns one Kenneth Skyler Baker, 
III, and said petition may contain the following information: 
a. Child's name: KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, III 
b. State of Residence or Birth Certificate: NORTH CAROLINA 
c. Natural Mother executing consent: ANGELA BAKER 
' d. Natural Father: FRANK OSBORNE, JR. 
e. Adoption Agency: ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE 
f. Date of Petition: AFTER JANUARY 6, 2002 
g. Date of Birth: AUGUST 6, 2001; 
In said deposition, you will be asked to provide the following: 
(a) the name and address of adoptive parents therein; 
(b) the attorneys involved in the filing of the adoption petition; 
(c) the county in which the adoption petition has been filed, and the name of all 
judges who have issued any rulings or orders in the adoption case, and the case number of the 
adoption case. 
This subpoena amends and replaces the previous subpoena served on James Webb on 
February 20, 2002. 
DATED this 21st day of February, 2002. 
/ A (W: 
PHKLIP~E.NfcOWRY, for ~ 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
J:\PEL\OSBORNE2.SUB 
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, m, 
A Minor Child. 
VERIFIED PETITION 
CHALLENGING SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. SECTION 78-45c-109 
Case No. 
Judge i^/m^jry 
Division # «—) 
Petitioner Frank Osborne here files this petition with the Court challenging its subject 
matter jurisdiction to enter a custody determination/adoption decree over petitioner's son, Kenneth 
Skyler Baker, HI. This petition is brought under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Enforcement Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101, et al. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Petitioner is a resident of Gaston County, North Carolina. 
2. There are three potential respondents to this petition. The first is the Adoption 
Center of Choice, a Utah corporation whose principal place of business is in Utah County, Utah. The 
other two respondents are the adoptive parents, whose identity is unknown, but who are believed to 
be Utah residents. 
3. On November 19,2000, petitioner met Angela Baker, the birth mother. Petitioner 
struck up a relationship with Angela Baker and at the end of November, 2000, petitioner moved into 
Ms. Baker's home. 
4. At this time, Ms. Baker had a two-year-old son, DJ. Petitioner developed a 
parental relationship with DJ. that has persisted to the present date. 
5. On December 10, 2000, Ms. Baker informed petitioner that she was pregnant. 
Petitioner resolved at that time to provide for the new child and regarded the new child, Ms. Baker 
and Ms. Baker's son, DJ., as a family unit for which he was responsible. 
6. On January 12,2001, petitioner bought a new home located at 1201 Alberto Lane 
in Stanley, North Carolina. Petitioner moved into this home along with Ms. Baker and D J. At this 
point, petitioner's relationship with D J. matured to the point that D J. called petitioner "Dad." 
7. In February, 2001, Ms. Baker was instructed by her doctor to be on bed rest 
because her pregnancy was regarded by her physician as being high risk. She followed the doctor's 
instructions and continued to live in the home Mr. Osborne has purchased. 
8. Mr. Osborne maintained the home and provided for Ms. Baker and D J. Ms. Baker 
was not employed during the pregnancy from February forward. 
9. Ms. Baker continued to live in petitioner's home through July, 2001. It was during 
this month that Ms. Baker first called an adoption agency called An Act of Love. Petitioner 
discovered that she had made contact with the adoption agency and expressed his disapproval. Ms. 
Baker represented at that point that she would not place the baby for adoption and attributed her 
actions to the fact that her psychiatric medications were apparently not working properly. Later that 
night, she checked herself into the local mental health center uttering suicide threats. 
2 
10. After Ms. Baker returned from the mental health center and moved back into the 
home, petitioner continued his work schedule. One day at work he was informed by a neighbor that 
Ms. Baker and her mother had taken all of their possessions from the home and moved out. 
Petitioner contacted Ms. Baker's aunt who informed him that she had flown to Utah where a doctor 
had induced labor and where she was about to place the baby for adoption. 
11. On August 6, 2001, Ms. Baker called petitioner at work. She told petitioner that 
she had borne a son and that she was coming home with the baby boy and D.J. On August 7,2001, 
she traveled back to North Carolina by bus. The child was in Utah for one day. 
12. Upon returning, Ms. Baker went to her mother's home for one week. She then 
indicated that she wished to return to the residence the petitioner had purchased. Petitioner and his 
father moved Ms. Baker and her mother back into the home. 
13. From August to October, 2001, Ms. Baker, the petitioner, D.J. and Ms. Baker's 
mother lived together in petitioner's home. Ms. Baker and the petitioner had a number of 
conversations regarding the fact that the child did not bear petitioner's name. 
14. During this time also, Ms. Baker would continue to have episodes of emotional or 
psychological distress. She would act out inappropriately and occasionally throw things. Petitioner 
ascribed her conduct to her psychological condition. 
15. During this entire time, D.J., Ms. Baker's son, and the baby boy developed a 
bonding relationship. 
16. In November and December, 2001, D.J. and the baby continued to develop a 
bonding relationship.. 
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17. Thanksgiving 2001 was celebrated with Ms. Baker's family. Petitioner cooked and 
prepared the Thanksgiving meal. This was at Ms. Baker's family's residence in Stanley, North 
Carolina. 
18. In early December, 2001, in an effort to rectify the fact that the child was not 
named after petitioner, petitioner twice secured a blank Affidavit for Voluntary Declaration of 
Paternity for execution under North Carolina law. Ms. Baker signed both of these documents but 
then became distressed and ripped the documents up in front of petitioner. 
19. During the month of December, 2001, petitioner and Ms. Baker's relationship 
deteriorated. Even so, petitioner and Ms. Baker continued to cohabit in the petitioner's home, and 
petitioner continued to provide for Ms. Baker, D.J. and the baby. 
20. On December 10,2001, the relationship deteriorated to the point that Ms. Baker 
took DJ. and the baby and moved out of the house and took many of the possessions of both Ms. 
Baker and the petitioner with her. 
21. On December 15,2001, Ms. Baker contacted the petitioner's mother and asked if 
she could take the baby to the hospital for an ear infection and respiratory distress. She also 
indicated that she needed those items that she was accustomed to the petitioner providing (diapers, 
gas drops, formula, etc.). Petitioner complied with these requests. 
22. On December 28, 2001, Ms. Baker came to petitioner's home and picked up 
Christmas presents that had been purchased by the petitioner for both D.J. and for the baby. 
23. December 28,2001, was the last time that the petitioner has seen the baby. In early 
January, 2002, he received a call from Ms. Baker, and she left a message on his answering machine 
stating that she was going to Utah, and that he "had no chance in hell" of getting him back because 
the petitioner could not fight the State of Utah and could not win there. 
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24. At this juncture, petitioner called the Department of Social Services in Gastonia, 
North Carolina and spoke with Patricia L. Hovis, an employee of that office, regarding adoption 
placement. 
25. On or about January 4, 2002, Ms. Baker left North Carolina for Utah, where she 
arranged to place the child for adoption. Upon returning she informed petitioner that she had placed 
the child for adoption with an adoption agency called The Adoption Center of Choice. Petitioner 
contacted The Adoption Center of Choice for information regarding the adoption and was given 
none. 
26. All of the petitioner's information regarding the pendency of the adoption has come 
from Ms. Baker. 
27. In his communication with The Adoption Center of Choice, petitioner was 
informed that the child had been placed with a set of adoptive parents located in the State of Utah. 
This communication was confirmed by further representations made by the adoptive mother, Ms. 
Baker. 
28. Petitioner alleges and believes that the adoptive parents and/or The Adoption 
Center of Choice have filed a petition for adoption of the child in Utah for purposes of placing the 
child with a set of Utah residents as adoptive parents. 
29. Respondents agency and/or adoptive parents failed to secure the approval of the 
North Carolina or Utah administrator of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children before 
the filing of the adoption petition in question. 
30. On February 11, 2002, the petitioner commenced a paternity and custody action 
by filing Verified Complaint with the North Carolina General Court of Justice, District Court 
Division, Case No. 02-CvD-478, Gaston County, North Carolina. A copy of the complaint is 
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attached as Exhibit A. The address of the court is Clerk of Superior Court, Att'n: Civil, P.O. Box 
340, Gastonia, N.C. 28053, and the telephone number for the court is (704) 852-3100. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction) 
31. Petitioner incorporates previous allegations of this petition consistent with this 
count. 
32. The governing law in this matter is Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101, et al., otherwise 
known as the Utah Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. 
33. The Act provides for specific remedies in instances where custody of a child 
transported between states is at issue. 
34. Adoption proceedings are specifically covered under the provisions of the Act and 
under the applicable precedent of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
3 5. Specifically, the code defines a child custody proceeding as a proceeding in which 
legal custody, physical custody or parent-time with respect to a child is at issue, including a 
proceeding for a divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination 
of parental rights, and protection from the domestic violence in which the issue may appear. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45c-102(4). 
36. The code differentiates between a child's home state and states that are not the 
child's home state. A home state is defined as a state in which a child lived with a parent or a person 
acting as a parent for at least consecutive months. In the case of a child less than six months of age, 
the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45c-102(7). 
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37. As alleged above, before the Utah adoption petition was filed the child subject of 
this petition had lived his entire life in the State of North Carolina, with the exception of the first day 
of his life. He had lived that time with the natural mother, Angela Baker, his natural brother, and 
his natural father, Frank Osborne, petitioner herein. 
38. Petitioner, by making this petition to the Court and by appearing herein, does not 
subject himself to the personal jurisdiction of the State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-109(l) 
provides that a party to a child custody proceeding who is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this 
state and is a responding party under the jurisdictional provisions of the statute does not subject him 
or herself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. This creates a statutorily specific modification to 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12 provisions allowing for what were once termed "special 
appearances." Petitioner, at this juncture, confines his petition for relief only to the jurisdictional 
issue, but reserves the right to pursue other remedies in the event this Court rules it has jurisdiction. 
Those remedies are not asserted at this time. Petitioner specifically alleges that he is not subject to 
the personal jurisdiction of the Utah courts for purposes of the Utah courts' exercising and applying 
Utah adoption laws specifically to him. Petitioner contends that this Court must first make a 
determination of its jurisdiction and that the Court cannot make a determination that it has 
jurisdiction simply by virtue of his challenging that jurisdiction under § 78-45c-109. 
39. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-201, this Court may exercise jurisdiction only if 
it is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home 
state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is 
absent jfrom the state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45c-201(l)(a). Such facts do not exist in this case inasmuch as the child's home 
state is North Carolina and both of the child's parents have lived in North Carolina with the child 
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since shortly after the child's birth. (Petitioner also alleges, infra, that no valid proceeding has been 
commenced, save the petition for paternity filed in North Carolina, because of several violations of 
Utah law). 
40. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204, a court of this state has temporary emergency 
jurisdiction if a child is present in the state and it is "necessary in an emergency" to protect the child 
because of actual or threatened mistreatment or abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(l). These 
facts do not apply in this case. 
41. Even were this Court to find that it could exercise temporary emergency 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(l), that jurisdiction is both "temporary" and 
"emergency." Accordingly, the code provides that this Court may exercise jurisdiction only until 
such time as an order is obtained from the child's home state regarding custody. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45c-204(2). 
42. With respect to actions that have not yet been reduced to order but are still pending, 
the code provides that a court of this state that has been asked to make a child custody determination 
under the temporary emergency jurisdiction provision, upon being informed that a child custody 
proceeding has been commenced, shall immediately communicate with the other court. If this Court 
determines it has temporary emergency jurisdiction, Petitioner here requests that the Court 
immediately contact the North Carolina court in Case No. 02-CvD-478 (address and phone number 
above) for purposes of resolving any emergency the Court may define as existent, to protect the 
safety of the parties (including the petitioner) and the child, and to otherwise make findings and 
conclusions with respect to the duration of any temporary custody order this Court may deem it has 
jurisdiction to issue pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204. The communication requirement 
is stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(4). (Nonetheless, petitioner here reiterates and contends 
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that this Court has no jurisdiction to exercise under § 78-45c-204 as there is no emergent situation) 
43. The code also specifically states that if this Court, after its communication with the 
North Carolina court, determines that the North Carolina court is exercising its jurisdiction in the 
custody proceeding substantially in conformity with the provisions of the Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (or its predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act), then this Court shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state. 
This defers to the North Carolina court to let it make the determination as to whether it is the state 
that is the more appropriate forum. If it so concludes, this Court must dismiss the proceeding. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45c-206(2). 
44. Timing of the proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-206 is relevant, but 
only if there is a proper preceding case regarding custody that sounds appropriately under the Act. 
In this instance, one cannot claim that the Utah proceeding is a proper custody proceeding under the 
Act because of this Court's lack of jurisdiction under § 78-45c-201 through -203, as alleged above. 
Therefore, the priority of this Court's proceeding cannot be used to bootstrap this Court's jurisdiction. 
(This is the fundamental policy behind the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement 
Act: to prevent interstate parental kidnaping and forum shopping in a race to the courthouse.) 
45. Jurisdiction of this Court is further improper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-208 
which vests this Court with discretion to decline exercised jurisdiction by virtue of the unjustifiable 
conduct of the individual invoking the jurisdiction of the Court. In this instance, the natural mother 
unilaterally uprooted her child from his home of five months and away from his natural father and 
brother, transported him to Utah and placed him with an indiscriminate adoption agency. Utah was 
"the right place" because of its strict adoption code and relative ease of terminating a father's parental 
right, the constitutionality of which in this particular case is suspect on a variety of fronts. These 
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indisputable facts reveal a plot by the natural mother and adoption agency that is, at best, unseemly 
and, at worst, illegal. 
46. For these reasons, the Court should deem the adoption petition as filed in bad faith 
in that the conduct of the adoption agency and the adoptive parents is unjustifiable and, therefore, 
should decline to exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-208. 
47. The custody proceeding at issue in this matter (namely, the adoption petition which 
this petition collaterally attacks) is further void and of no effect as to the petitioner because the 
petitioner received no notice thereof nor was served with proceed therein. The Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act contains specific notice provisions regarding custody 
determinations. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-205. The code specifically states that "this chapter does 
not govern the enforceability of a child custody determination made without notice and an 
opportunity to be heard." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-205(2). 
48. The custody proceeding at issue in this matter (namely, the adoption petition which 
this petition collaterally attacks) is further void and of no effect because of the respondents' failure 
to comply with the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, adopted by Utah at U.C. A. § 
62A-4a-701. The North Carolina Compact Administrator has officially protested the violation of 
the Compact (a copy of the protest is attached as Exhibit B). Such a violation constitutes a violation 
of the laws of the State of Utah, and renders void the filing of the adoption petition in question. 
49. Section 78-45c-308 of the code allows for expedited enforcement of child custody 
determinations. Petitioner here requests that the Court immediately schedule a hearing on the issue 
of whether it has jurisdiction over custody of this child. The code specifically states that the hearing 
in question shall be held on the next judicial day following the service or process, unless that date 
is impossible. In that event, the Court shall hold the hearing on the first day possible. Petitioner here 
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requests such a hearing, demanding that the defendant parties, specifically, the adoptive parents and 
a representative of the adoption agency, appear. As part of the relief demanded, petitioner requests 
that the identity of the adoptive parents be revealed immediately, before the hearing, pursuant to this 
Court's authority to grant relief under U.C.A. § 78-30-15 to open the Utah adoption file so that 
service of process may be immediately effected. 
11 
r\ r\ 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows: 
1. That the adoption file in this matter to be opened so as to effect service on the 
respondents and to investigate the pending proceedings; 
2. That this court declare that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the pending 
adoption proceeding, or that it decline to exercise jurisdiction; 
3. That upon finding it has no jurisdiction or that it declines jurisdiction, that it 
communicate this result to the Superior Court of Gaston County, North Carolina, 
so that that court may make an appropriate determination of custody over the child; 
4. That upon such court reaching a custody determination (whether such custody be 
vested in an individual or the North Carohna Department of Social Services, and 
whether it be temporary or permanent), that this Court vest such determination 
with full faith and credit after proper registration of the North Carolina court order 
in the State of Utah, and this Court at that time enforce said order by issuing such 
writs as it deems proper, including a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Utah 
UCCJEA. 
DATED this / r day of February, 2002. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 




STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF GASTON ) 
Frank Osborne, Jr., being duly sworn, states that he is the petitioner in the above-entitled 
action, that he has read the foregoing petition and that the statements contained therein are true 
and accurate to the best of his own personal knowledge, inforniation and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ^-~> day of February, 2001 \3 f: 
2L 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Notary Public, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina 






STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA • oa-cvp- f^P, 
Gaston County In The General Court Of Just 
0 District D Superior Court Divi 
Nome Of Plaintiff 
Frank Edward Osborne, Jr. 
Address 
City. Stat a. Zip 
VERSUS 
Name Of Defandentfsr 
Angela Catherine Baker 
CIVIL SUMMONS 
G S 1 A-1 Rult 
Q Alias and Piunes Summons 
Data Last Summons Issued 
To Each Of The Defandont(e) Named Below: 
Nam§ And Addntss Of Dafandant 1 
Angela Catherine Baker 
9711 Willilyn Una 
Charlotte, NC 28214 
Nam* And Address Of Dafandant 2 
A Civil Action Has Been Commenced Against You! 
You are notified to appear and answer the complaint of the plaintiff as follows: 
1. Serve a copy of your written enswer to the complaint upon the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney within thirty (3( 
days after you have been served. You may serve your answer by delivering a copy to the plaintiff or by maili 
to the plaintiff's la3t known address, and 
2. File the original of the written answer with the Clerk of Superior Court of the county named above. 
If you fail to answer the complaint, the plaintiff will apply to the Court for the relief demanded in the complaint. 
Nmmm And Addraas Of Plaintiff's Attorney (if Nona. Addraaa Of Plaintiff! 
Richard B. Schultz 
P. 0. Box 1232 
Gastonia, North Carolina 28053 
Data Of Endorsement Tim a 
D A M D 
Signature 
I I Deputy CSC L j Assistant CSC LJ Clark Of Superior Coi 
• ENDORSEMENT 
This Summons was originally issued on the date 
indicated above and returned not served. At the 
request of the plaintiff, the time within which this 
Summons must be served Is extended thirty (30) 
days. 
NOTE TO PARTIES: Many counties have MANDATORY ARBITRATION programs in which most cases where the amount in controversy n 
SI 5,000 or Its* are hoard by on arbitrator before a trial. The parties will be notified if this cese is assigned for mane 
arbitration, and, if 30. what procedure is to be followed. 
AOC-CV-100 
Rov 9/96 
*1997 Administrative Office of \he Courts 
(Over) 
?F» 
NORTH CAROLINA BLED 
an FEB 
IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
DISTRICT COURT DIVISION Vi> CO / / AH UX5TR1CT LUUKI 
GASTON COUNTY ™ 9'-(4$ FILE tt 02-CvO-
Br 
FRANK EOUARO OSBORNE, 
PLAINTIFF, 
- v e -
ANQELA CATHERINE BAKER, 
DEFENDANT. 
C O N P L A X N T 
e a y e 
THE PLAINTIFF. 
ae f prl.i.oue.i--. 
complaining of the Defendant, alleges and 
1. The Plaintiff ie a oltixen and reeidant of Qa«ton 
County, North Carolina, and hae been euch for more than six (6) 
monthe next immediately preceding the commencement of thie 
action. 
2. The Oefendant ie a 
County, North Carolina, 
citizen and resident of Mecklenburg 
3. The Plaintiff and the Defendant have never been lawfully 
marriedj however,
 ; ithey are the natural and biological parente of 
one minor child, to ulti Kenneth Skylar Baker, III, born August 
6, 2001, in Oram, Utah. 
4. Facte exist which Juetify the Courte of the State of 
North Carolina to aeeume Jurisdiction of the custody issues in 
this oauee of aotlon, pursuant to the Uniform Child-Cue tody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, ae codified by Chapter 50A of 
the North Carolina General Statutes. 
5. Until Just prior to the birth of said minor child, the 
Plaintiff and the Oefendant lived together at the Plaintiff's 
residence at 1201 Alberto Lane, Stanley, North Carolina, for more 
than six (6) mon t h e . 
6. Just prior to the birth of said minor child, the 
Defendant went to the State of Utah for rea6on6 which were then 
unknown to the Plaintiff; that almost immediately after giving 
birth to eaid minor child on August 6, 2001, the Defendant got on 
a bue In the 9tate of Utah with eaid minor child for the next 
three (3) days and returned to the State of North Carolinaj that 
the Defendant and eald minor child arrived back In North Carolina 
on August 9, 2001j that from August 9, 2001, until August 16, 
24 
I 
2001, said minor ohild resided uith the Oefandant and the 
I Defendant1* mother at 12214 Sherman Drive, Charlotte. North 
Carolina! that from Auguet 16, 2001, until December 10, 2001, 
eaid minor child reeided with the Plaintiff, the Defendant and 
the Defendant** mother at 1201 Alberto Lane, Stanley, North 
Carollnai that on Oecember 10, 2001, eaid minor child and the 
Plaintiff went to the residence of the Plaintiffs mother at 3600 
Enfield Road, Charlotte, North Carolina! that on Deoember 11, 
2001, the Defendant took eaid minor child to reside at the 
residence of the Defendant1© grandmother at 6631 Candlowood 
Drive, Charlotte, North Carolina; that eaid minor child continued 
to reeide with the Defendant at eaid reeldence until on or about 
January 4, 2002, when, upon information and belief, the Defendant 
once again took eaid minor ohild to the State of Utah, where the 
Oefandant, upon information and belief, arranged to give said 
minor child up for adoption, without the coneent of the 
Plaintiff. 
7. There have been no prior actions in this or any other 
Jurisdiction concerning the custody of eaid minor child, save and 
except for ona or more domestic violence aotlone filed in 2001 in 
either Mecklenburg County and/or Qaeton County, North Carolina, 
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, wherein temporary 
custody of said minor child was sought by the Defendant. 
8. The Plaintiff knows of no one other than the Defendant 
who is a real party in interest concerning the custody of eaid 
minor ohild. 
9. Tha Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the 
primary cars, custody, tuition and control of said minor child of 
the parties. 
10. It would be consistent with the best interests of said 
minor ohild of tha parties to be in the primary custody of the 
Plaintiff. J 
11. For a variety of reasons, the Defendant is not a fit 
and proper person to have the cuetody of said minor child, most 
demonstrably by reajeon of the faot that the Defendant has ©ought 
to havs no further relationship with said minor ohild by giving 
said minor child up for adoption in the State of Utah, 
12. Except for the fact that said minor child was actually 
born In the State of Utah and that the Defendant approximately 
one month ago took said minor ohild to the State of Utah to be 
given up for adoption, neither party has any significant 
connection with the State of Utah, 
13. It would be consistent with the best interests of said 
minor ohild for the Plaintiff's paternity of eaid minor child to 
[bo conclusively setablishsd via gsnstic testing. 
23 
WHEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF RESPECTFULLY PRAYS THE COURTi 
[1] That the Plaintiff be awarded the primary custody of 
Kmnnmth Skylmr B*kmrp I I I , born August 6, 2001 \ 
[2] That the court enter an order directing the parties to 
• ubrnit to appropriate genetic teetlng for the purpose of 
oonolueively eetabliehing the Plaintiff's paternity of eaid minor 
child; 
[3] That the Court enter appropriate ordere for the purpose 
of effectuating the return of said minor child to the State of 
North Carolina* 
[4] And for euch other and further relief ae to the Court 
may eeem Juet and proper. 
RICHARD B. SCHULTZ ^ 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 1232 
Qaetoniat North Carolina 28053 
Telephonei (704) 866-8868 
Telefax* (704) 866-0196 
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NORTH CAROLINA 
9 A S T 0 N COUNTY 
V E R I F T C A r I Q ff 
FRANK EDWARD OSBORNE, JR., being first duly eworn, 
dapoaaa and eaye that ha la tha Plaintiff in tho foregoing 
Complaint, and that am auch ha haa read tha oontanta tharaof and 
knowa the aame to be true and correct of his own knowledge, save 
and except aa to thoaa mattere therein allagad upon information 
and belief, and aa to thoaa thing*, ha belieyee tbjMq to be true 
^ ^ ^ J F R A N K EDWARD OSBORNE, JR 
I] Mp^'M'^Xo and aubacribad before ma 
thia 'tfi»\ 7 day of February, 2002. 
.yW/fSKY P U 0 L H 












DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
Children & Family Services 
330 N. Marietta St. 
Gastonia, North Carolina 28052 
(704) 862-7530 (704) 862-7898 - FAX Keith A. Moon 
Director 
[ion Center of Choice 
521 N 
h 84057-4696 
Re' Birth Mother Angela Catherine Wilkinson Baker 
Cnild - Kenneth Skyler 8aker (Also Known As Franklin Edward Osborne I I I ) 
D|te of Birth 08-06-2001 
[I 
Dear Sirs: 
The adoption staff of our agency has had considerable contact recently with Frank Osborne who 
states he k the biological father of the child named above. Apparently the birth mother lived with 
Mr Osbortie here until she traveled to Utah to give birth. Her Initial intent was to surrender the baby 
at birth (Mf- Osborne objected) |3Ut she did not and brought the child back to North Carolina with her 
where sharnoved back in with Mr. Osborne and they parented the child together. Efforts to 
legitimate |he baby were begun 'but when the birth mother had an argument with Mr Osborne, she 
fled with tjje baby to Utah wher$ she surrendered the child for adoption to your agency She then 
returned to North Carolina where she continues to reside 
p 
i 
While In North Carolina, we understand that Ms Baker on multiple occasions and to a variety of 
agencies presented Mr. Osborne as the child's biological father. We are exploring this further 
He objectsflto any plans for his son to be adopted and is in the process of Initiating legal action to 








to make sure you wqre informed of his opposition to the placement of this child into an 
me and his intent to texercise parental rights and responsibilities towards this child We 
fee you to contact hirti and involve him in the planning process We have begun 
isome of our questions and concerns via the Interstate Services System. 
Patricia L IHOVIS 
Social Wor(| Supervisor I I I - Adoption Dlvi&on 
cc. Linaa Wrightson, Interstate Adoption Consultant 
North Carolina Departmeht of Health and Human Services 








DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
Children & Family Services 
330 N. Marietta St. 
Gastonia, North Carolina 28052 
(*04) 862-7530 (704) 862-7898 - FAX Keith A. Moon 
Director 
rolina Department of Health and Human Services 
Jof Social Services- Interstate Adoptions 
|alisbury St. 
Service Center 
!NC 27699-2411 : 
Mtfl 
Attn: Linda Wrightson 
Interstate Adoption Consultant 
Re: upild - Kenneth Skyler Baker (born 08-06-2001) 
Mpther - Angela Catherine Wilkinson Baker 
Father - Franklin Edward Osborne 
Dear Ms ] Wrightson: 








like to make yoq aware of a potential adoption situation which we feel 
In the jurisdiction of the Interstate Compact yet we are not aware of any 
at compliance. This case involves a North Carolina mother and child- In 
jjnonth the mother took the child to Utah where she relinquished him for 
jto The Adoption Renter of Choice. Upon doing so, she returned to North 
The birth father fiere had been very involved with the mother and child, 
[she did not notlfyj him of her plans to surrender the child nor has the 
Utah involved him in the planning. 
It is our contention that both mother and child have North Carolina residency thus to 
ensure tttje safety and well being of the child, Interstate Services are needed. 
In order |o give you Insight into this matter, we are providing a detailed written 
report on the situation as Itl was brought to our attention. The birth mother is a legal 
resident tyf Mecklenburg County, NC and the birth father resides in Gaston County, 
NC. |( 
In addition, we want to inform you that a check of the North Carolina eligibility 
system pone today confirms that Angela Baker has consistently received various 
state public assistance benefits since 1999. Since it is a requirement that she be a 
North Carolina resident to:be eligible, records confirm she has not terminated her 
residency at any time. 
jl 
A furthet check revealed that Kenneth Skyler Baker has consistently received Work 
First benefits as a North Carolina resident with an effective date of 08-06-01. 
Currentw Angela Baker's assistance data shows that in January 2002 she is still 
receiving Work First, Meditaid, and food stamps in North Carolina with Skyler shown 
as a member of her household and a recipient of these programs as well. Due to 
the fact Hs. Baker receive}? public assistance, she was required to sign sworn 
affidavits naming Skyler's birth father. She did - Frank Osborne. This is entered in 
the North Carolina state system. 
is 
Therefore we are asking that this case be brought into compliance with the 
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. We have seen nothing to indicate 
this has been done to date\ Official North Carolina government files show Skyler as 
a resident of our state thus placement across state lines should be under the 
jurisdiction and directives of Interstate Services. 
We appreciate your prompt attention to this matter, 
needs may be addressed to me at 704-862-7925. 





















Case Regarding Kenneth Skvler- Born 08-06-2001 
Date: 01-23-2002 
Angela C Baker 
6331 Candlewood Dr. 
Charlotte, NC 28210 
Franklin E. Osborne 
1201 Alberto Lane 
Stanley, NC 28164 
cy has had a number of contacts in January 2002 from a Gaston County 
Frank Osborne, vyho Is concerned over the fact that earlier this month, his 
rlfri|nd, Angela Baker> took their infant son to Utah without his knowledge or 
nd relinquished him for adoption. Mr. Osborne was in need of direction 
nee. He stats he' loves his son and does not agree with a plan of adoption, 
havejjencouraged him to contact an attorney about pursuing this legally. At the 
we have some questions about how this potential adoption Is being 
&nd about the need for ICPC intervention and jurisdiction. 
Osborne to provide us a chronology of his relationship with Ms. Baker 
from thetjtime of Skyler's conception to the present and of how this relinquishment 
in Utah come to be. 












:o determine the situation and circumstances that led to this point, we 
Os&orne and Angela Baker had an established boyfriend/girlfriend relationship 
moved In together in 2000; this residence was in Mecklenburg County. It 
this time of cohabitation that she became pregnant. 
Osbolne, looking towards the future, purchased his current home in Gaston 
C. He and a pregnant Angela Baker moved in during January 2001. 
Ined together throughout the pregnancy until just before the child was 
T 1 
il-l! 
According to Mr. Osborne; Ms. Baker has a history of mental problems. She has 
participated in counseling through the local Mental Health Center and has been 
hospita jzed for inpatient psychiatric care In the past. 
As timejjfor the delivery drew near, Ms. Baker grew restless. Approximately two 
weeks prior to Skyler's birth, she had Mr, Osborne arrested for Communicating 
Threatswcharges since dismissed). He remained in Jail about three days before he 
was able to post bond. During the time he was locked up, Ms. Baker took 
furnishings from the house and moved in with her grandmother in Charlotte, NC. 
This would have been during the last week In July/first week in August 2001. 
Ms. Bak|r did not inform Mr. Osborne that she was considering adoption. Once she 
gave birth, she called him to say she was in Utah where the baby had just been 
delivered. She explained $he had contacted an adoption agency in Utah and after 
consulti|g with them, she had gone there to deliver with plans to relinquish the child 
for adoption. However once their son was bom, she changed her mind and did not 
follow through. 
During this conversation she told him she planned to name the baby Franklin 
Edward Osborne I I I . This name appeared on some early paperwork but when she 
actually Completed the birth certificate, she named him Kenneth Skyler Baker. His 
birth certificate confirms h$ was bom at 9:48 pm on 08-06-2001 at Timpanogos 
RegionajjHospital in Orem,;Utah. 
Mr. Osb 







ne told her he wanted her and the baby to come home so they could live 
y. They talked oyer their problems and mutually decided to reconcile. The 
born the first part of the week; since she was not relinquishing, she and 
were sent home to North Carolina by bus and were back here by Friday of 
week. The bus trip was reportedly three days long thus despite Utah 
place of the child's birth, he actually only lived there a couple days at 
bably the length of the post-natal hospital stay. Ms. Baker did not 
Sa residence in Uta!h. 
Upon the r return to North Carolina on or about 08-10-2001, Ms. Baker and Skyler 
moved b|ck into the Gastoin County residence of Mr. Osborne. Also residing there 
were MsJiBaker's older son iand her mother. During this time, she presented Skyler 
as the sojji of Mr. Osborne and received public assistance for herself and both sons. 
ji ; 
They continued to live together until approximately 12-10-2001. They had an 
argument on that date which resulted In Ms. Baker slashing his tires. Law 
enforcement officers advised him take the baby and leave home to provide her with 
some "cofcl down" time. HQ did so and went to his mother's home In Mecklenburg 
County. Around 3:00 am officers came there to arrest him; Ms. Baker had again 
charged liim with Communicating Threats. When he was taken to jail, Ms. Baker 
came to tfie home and took Skyler. 
Apparently some sort of restraining order was also issued pending a hearing 
becaus^Ms, Baker continued to live In Mr. Osborne's Gaston County home with the 
baby whSie Mr.Osborne stayed with his mother in Charlotte. 
8 
They nej^ er reunited as a couple following the December 2001 break up but were 
able to establish some lev^l of rapport. On at least five different dates between 
December 12 and 23, she brought Skyler to visit Mr. Osborne. She was then living 
in Mecklenburg County with her sons. 
She wasijscheduled to brinp Skyler to visit Mr. Osborne on December 28, However 
she calle|j him to cancel stating there had been a death in the family so she had to 
change ner plans; Caller 10 showed this call was made from her grandmother's 
Mecklenpurg County, NC home. 
The nextj information Mr.Osborne received regarding his son came from a mutual 
friend who called on 01-05J-2002 to inform him that Ms, Baker had gone to Utah and 
surrendered Skyler for adoption to an agency there. Desperate, Mr. Osborne and 
his mothfcr made multiple calls to Utah trying to locate her and/or the agency 
involved! 
| 
Finally on) 01-06-2002 theyjfound the motel where she stayed while surrendering 
Skyler but were told she held just checked out On 01-07-2002, they saw her here 
in North tarolina. She is staying at her grandmother's home in Charlotte, NC. 
Mr. Osbope last saw her approximately 01-20-2002 when the two were In court 
regarding charges they had taken out These were dismissed. Apparently both 
parties have taken out assarted charges on each other. All but one taken out by Ms, 
Baker aglinst Mr. Osborne have been dismissed and that one is not scheduled for a 
hearing ijntll the end of thi$ month. 
With Internet assistance antf a lot of persistence, Mr, Osborne located the adoption 
agency involved in this surrender - The Adoption Center of Choice in Orem, Utah, 
Reported\y officials there told him he essentially had no parental rights and was 
"only onalof three" possibilities as the birth father. They have initiated no efforts to 
contact op involve him at arjy time in the planning for his son. 
When we( 
is the fat 
concepti 
other me 
to stop t 
Iquizzed him about the paternity issue, he stated he has no doubts that he 
r of Skyler. He was living with Angela Baker before conception, at 
, and until the end of the pregnancy. He said she was not involved with 





rne states he is committed to providing for his son and does not want 
for adoption, Mr, Osborne's mother has expressed her support for her 








pf agency files and the North Carolina Division of Social Services' statewide 
computer system! confirms that Angela Baker and her sons, Donny and 
Skyler Baker, are [listed as North Carolina residents and all are currently 
In open state public assistance programs at this time. 
Amgela Baker has received various forms of public assistance in North 
Carolina since years; before Skyler's conception. There has been no break in 
h$r state residency.; 
Currently she receives Work First money payments, Medicaid, and food 
imps through Medklenburg County DSS. 
S|e was a recipient pf public assistance in NC when she went to Utah to 
driver Skyler. She did not change her residency to Utah and there was no 
gap in coverage. 
Slj^ler Is included in ithe Work First, Medicaid, and food stamp program grants 
aaja member of Angela Baker's household. He has received these benefits 
consistently since his birth on 08-06-2001. As of 01-23-2002 he Is still shown 
asllan open case In Mecklenburg County. 
| documents filed with the state of North Carolina as a requirement of the 
!$ governing publlb assistance, Angela Baker has signed sworn documents 
|t Frank Osborne ik the birth father of Kenneth Skyler Baker. She listed no 
ottier possible fathers. 
ler received Immqinizations through the Gaston County (NC) Health 





Utah or tl 
the week 
that even though Skyler was born in Utah, his legal residence is in North 
"here is no indication his mother ever intended to establish residency in 
Jt she ever lost custody of him prior to her return to NC with him during 
if his birth. 
There is documented proof that Skyler resided with his mother and half-brother in 
North Carolina from August £001 until January 2002. During that time, there is 
official documentation that Angela Baker presented him as a resident of North 
t o 
Carolinaland signed paternity affidavits naming Frank Osborne as his birth father 
with no ifcther possibilities hamed. 
Therefotb we feel that thej placement of this child across state lines for adoption, 
while a legal option for thej mother, Is a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the 
Interstate Compact for Placement of Children since Skyler is a North Carolina 
resident With planned placement in Utah. 
We ask that the North Carolina ICPC office pursue this to insure legal compliance, 
protectiqp of all parties' rights, and the well being of Kenneth Skyler Baker. 
Prepared by: 
Patricia 1| Hovis 
Social Wflrk Supervisor I I I 
i 
Gaston Qbunty Department of Social Services AdoDtion Program 











Adoption Center of Choice, a 
Utah Corporation, John Doe and 
Jane Doe, Adoptive Parents, 
Respondents. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 0 2 2002 
Pauiette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
C a s e No. 20020489-CA 
iiEiiivira 
JUL 0 5 2002 
HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme, 
This case is before the court on a petition for 
extraordinary relief. Petitioner seeks relief in the form of: 
1) a writ of mandamus against every district court in the state 
to prevent the finalization of the adoption scheduled for 
sometime after July 4, 2002; 2) an order to compel the adoption 
agency to reveal the identity of the adoptive parents; and 3) 
an order to allow the petitioner, alleging he is the biological 
father, to intervene in the adoption without waiving his 
objection to personal jurisdiction. 
11
 [I] n the case of unmarried father, a biological 
relationship alone is insufficient to establish 
constitutionally protected parental rights." In re Adoption of 
B.B.D, 1999 UT 70,1(10, 984 P.2d 967 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 
463 U.S. 248, 257-60, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983)). Utah statutes 
governing the rights of an unmarried, biological father are 
self-operative. "When an illegitimate child is relinquished by 
its mother, the rights of the father are automatically 
terminated unless he has previously filed an acknowledgment of 
paternity." Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 640 
(Utah 1990). In order to preserve his rights, an unmarried 
father must: 1) initiate a proceeding to establish paternity; 
2) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings; 
and 3) pay a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses 
incurred by the pregnancy, if he had actual knowledge of it. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2) (b) (Supp. 2001) ; see also In 
re Adoption of B.B.D, 1999 UT 70 at ^16. If an unmarried 
father fails to "fully and strictly comply" with all of these 
conditions before the mother relinquishes the child for 
adoption, he "is deemed to have waived and surrendered any 
right in relation to the child, including the right to notice 
of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of 
the child, and his consent to the adoption is not required." 
Id. 78-30-4.14(5) . Petitioner has failed to establish he has 
met any of these requirements. He knew that the mother had 
given birth in Utah. Thereafter, the mother and child returned 
to North Carolina and temporarily resided with Petitioner. 
Nonetheless, Petitioner never took any legal action in either 
Utah or North Carolina to preserve his rights in the child. 
The Legislature has seen fit to offer additional 
protections to unmarried biological fathers residing in another 
state. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15.(4) provides: 
The Legislature finds that an unmarried 
biological father who resides in another 
state may not, in every circumstance, be 
reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly 
comply with, the requirements of this 
chapter. Therefore when all of the following 
requirements have been met, that unmarried 
biological father may contest an adoption, 
prior to the finalization of the decree of 
adoption, and assert his interest in the 
child; the court may then, in its discretion, 
proceed with an evidentiary hearing under 
Subsection 78-30-4.16(2): 
(d) the unmarried biological father has 
complied with the most stringent and complete 
requirements of the state where the mother 
previously resided or was located, in order 
to protect and preserve his parental interest 
and right in the child in cases of adoption. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15 (4) (d) . In this case, Petitioner 
clearly fails to meet at least the requirement under subsection 
(d), because he took absolutely no legal action in his home state 
of North Carolina for the five months prior to the mother's 
relinquishment. Petitioner has simply failed to take any timely 
action to preserve his rights to this child. 
Regarding Petitioner's jurisdictional argument, the question 
of personal jurisdiction only arises when a defendant is called 
to defend an action in court. The district court did not need or 
attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction over Petitioner. He 
lost his rights to the child by operation of law when he failed 
to take the statutory steps required to protect his rights. See 
Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d at 640. Furthermore, it 
is Petitioner, as a plaintiff, seeking relief in Utah courts who 
has invoked the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. The fact that 
court action, and the operation of law, affected the father's 
unprotected parental rights does not implicate personal 
jurisdiction. If Petitioner wants to protect and assert his 
20020489-CA 2 
rights in a child relinquished for adoption in Utah, he must take 
the necessary action to protect his rights under Utah law. He 
cannot simply stand on the "sidelines" and claim that Utah courts 
lack jurisdiction over him. See In re Adoption of B.B.D. 1999 UT 
70 at ^29. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ of mandamus 
and temporary restraining order are denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent's request for attorney 
fees and costs is denied. 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of Kenneth Skyler Baker, m, ) 
A person under 18 years. ] 
ORDER REGARDING BIRTH 
1 FATHER'S RIGHTS 
) Probate No. 022400054 
This matter came before the Court on Petitioner's Petition for Determination of 
Birth Father Rights filed March 8, 2002. Based upon this Court's Memorandum Decision dated 
March 29, 2002, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED, that pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5), any person, including Frank Osborne, claiming to be the putative natural 
father of the minor child is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the 
minor child, including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the 
adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required. 
DATED this Sfday of April, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
Steven L. Hansen, Judge, I ;... ^ 
Fourth Judicial District Coart*^, .^ 
**** net"*/' 
SAWPDATA\PLEADING\ADOFnON CENTER3AKER.ORDER RE BIRTH FATHER RIGHTS.wpd 
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